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Abstract
ESSAY 1: CHANGES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION FLEXIBILITY AND FINANCIAL
STATEMENT LOCATION OF MANDATED ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
by

Ethan Kinory
Adviser: Professor Steven B. Lilien

In the 20 years since Balsam et al. (1995b) found evidence that mandated accounting standards
provide significant implementation flexibility, numerous structural and environmental changes
have occurred to the accounting standards setting process. Using a more recent sample of 13
significant mandated accounting promulgations, I reexamine whether implementation flexibility
continues to characterize accounting standards. I find that standards continue to avail firms with
adoption timing options. However, it appears that the FASB’s previously documented proclivity
to direct equity increasing (decreasing) adjustments to the income statement (balance sheet)
temporarily abated in the early years of my study, but this behavior was revived in 2006.
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Abstract
ESSAY 2: DOES THE FINANCIAL STATEMENT LOCATION OF TRANSITION
ADJUSTMENTS MATTER TO INVESTORS?
by

Ethan Kinory
Adviser: Professor Steven B. Lilien

Transition adjustments arising from the adoption of promulgated accounting standards are
recognized in firms’ financial statements. However, the mandated location of these adjustments
has shifted throughout the FASB’s history. Early in the FASB’s existence (1973-1988),
transition adjustments were often recognized as part of ordinary income. Subsequent periods
(1989-2014) saw the introduction of below the line adjustments to income, and, more recently,
the advent of adjustments to comprehensive income. In this paper I explore whether the stock
market exhibits a differential response to alternative financial statement reporting locations. I
find that when firms adopt new accounting standards investors react to the magnitude of the
transition adjustments, but there are no discernable valuation effects across alternative reporting
locations. This suggests that affording firms with flexibility in the reporting location of transition
adjustments might not effectively mitigate standard setters’ political costs.
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Essay 1: Changes in the Implementation Flexibility and Financial Statement Location of
Mandated Accounting Standards
1. Introduction
In “Mandated Accounting Changes and Managerial Discretion”, Balsam et al. (1995b)
examine the impact of eleven major mandatory FASB promulgations on Fortune 500 firms’
financial statements. They provide evidence that the FASB seeks to reduce its political costs by
issuing standards that afford managers with implementation flexibility. 1 This flexibility permits
managers to exercise discretion over the timing, and method, of adoption. However, the Balsam
et al. (1995b) study only examined mandatory accounting pronouncements issued through 1987.
There have since been numerous structural changes to the FASB, as well as changes to the
standard setting environment. For example, a path to eventual convergence with IFRS was
established; the FASB’s operational funds are now mandatorily assessed under SOX, rather than
received as voluntary contributions; the FASB’s voting rules have been changed; a transition
from emphasis on the income statement to the balance sheet occurred; a change in the nature of
pronouncements took place; and the representation of constituents changed on the Financial
Accounting Foundation’s (FAF) board. These changes are likely to have diminished preparer
influence on the standard setting process, and simultaneously enhanced the FASB’s ability to
operate independently. The effect of these changes on FASB pronouncements has not yet been
examined and it is unknown whether the previously documented implementation flexibility
continues to characterize mandatory pronouncements. I reexamine the findings of Balsam et al.

See Appendix B for a more thorough history of the FASB and the context within which it faces
political challenges.
1

1

(1995b) using a more recent sample of accounting standards in order to identify whether
managers continue to have discretion in the method and timing of accounting standards adoption.
2. Motivation and Research Question
2.1 Standards Setting and Operational Constraints
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has, for 41 years, performed the role
of private sector accounting standard setter for non-governmental entities. Common reasons cited
for the FASB’s endurance are that 1) it is an independent rule making body whose transparent
and democratic-style due process reflects the concerns of its constituents; 2) it is adequately
funded; and 3) it has captured a broad base of authoritative support. These attributes often do not
harmoniously coexist since the underlying conditions that give rise to each are in a perpetual
state of flux. Reporting incentives change, as do economic conditions and political climates.
Each of these changes threatens to undermine the FASB’s foundation of support, and, as such,
the FASB must constantly weigh the potential impact of its pronouncements against the
equilibrium state. This is achieved by balancing support from its constituents, the Financial
Accounting Foundation (FAF), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the U.S.
Congress.2
The FASB must be cognizant of the constraints imposed by these four entities with
divergent interests, and, when issuing accounting standards, the FASB has to exercise sufficient
care to avoid alienating the groups it relies on for legitimacy. This adds complexity to the

The FASB’s Rules of Procedure (2013) indicate: “The Board is accountable to the
Foundation’s Board of Trustees, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), and,
broadly, its stakeholders for establishing standards and concepts following those principles and
the comprehensive due process described in these Rules.”
2

2

decision making process and fosters what many perceive as the politicization of accounting
standard setting (e.g., Armstrong 1977, Fogarty et al. 1994, etc.). Miller et al. (1998) suggest that
politicization occurs between the FASB and its constituencies, and also between the FASB and
the SEC. Fogarty et al. (1994) posit that politicization stems from the economic consequences
accounting standards impose. They suggest that new accounting standards lead to reallocative
reporting outcomes, and thereby differentially affect constituents.
2.2 Potential Mitigation of Political Costs via Implementation Flexibility
The disparate effects of new accounting standards on users, preparers, auditors and the
public foster the pursuit of self-interests among constituent groups, and influence standard
setting. Therefore, it is impossible for the FASB to remain entirely impervious to the concerns of
its constituents, or to objectively evaluate the social and economic consequences of a new
standard given its participatory governance structure. To mitigate adverse reporting effects and
reduce political costs, many accounting pronouncements provide flexible implementation
options. These changes include flexibility in the timing of the required adoption, and in the
method of implementation. With regard to the former, some pronouncements allow early
adoption (e.g., SFAS 2), while others do not (e.g., SFAS 12). Occasionally a pronouncement also
permits adopters to choose between immediate and extended duration implementation (e.g.,
SFAS 106). Historically, mandated changes have required one of the following implementation
methods: 1) a prospective approach, 2) a retroactive approach, 3) a catch-up approach, 4) a
retroactive/catch-up approach, or 5) a combination of these approaches presented as options
(Balsam et al. 1995). In 2005 the FASB introduced retrospective application for changes in
accounting principles as part of SFAS 154, increasing the number of unique implementation
methods from five to six. These approaches differ in the manner and extent to which mandated
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changes affect past, current, and future financial statements. Prospective implementation, for
example, only impacts current and subsequent years; retroactive implementation requires a
restatement of all prior periods presented with an adjustment to the opening balance of retained
earnings; catch-up implementation requires a cumulative adjustment to the current period’s
income; and retroactive/catch-up implementation requires a cumulative adjustment on the
income statement only for the earliest year restated in comparative income statements (Balsam et
al. 1995). The variation in implementation methods and timing of adoption associated with
mandated accounting changes enables the FASB to mitigate the adverse effects associated with
new pronouncements, and thereby reduce potential political costs.
Balsam et al. (1995b) study the initial impact on firms’ equity resulting from the adoption
of eleven major mandatory FASB standards issued between 1973 and 1987. A dichotomous
pattern is observed where equity increasing pronouncements appear on the income statement,
but equity decreasing pronouncements bypass the income statement and appear only as direct
reductions to shareholders’ equity. This finding is consistent with claims that the FASB seeks to
minimize implementation costs. Additionally, in order to determine why some firms choose to
adopt mandatory FASB pronouncements early, the authors examine managers’ timing
decisions. Balsam et al. (1995b) find that early adopters opportunistically select the year of
adoption corresponding to when their change in ROA is lowest and their change in leverage is
highest; that is, managers manage firms’ income vis–à–vis the timing of their adoption of FASB
pronouncements. Collectively, these findings are consistent with the stated hypotheses that 1) the
FASB minimizes its own political costs by affording firms great flexibility in the timing of
mandatory pronouncement adoptions; and 2) the FASB permits different transition rules for
equity increasing changes in comparison to those for equity decreasing changes.

4

2.3 Recent Developments to the Standards Setting Environment
While the Balsam et al. (1995b) study suggests that the FASB afforded managerial
flexibility to firms adopting mandatory pronouncements in order to minimize the organization’s
political costs, circumstances have changed and it is unclear if this trend persists. Since Balsam,
et al.’s study was published in 1995, there have been at least six significant developments that
potentially influenced the extent to which implementation flexibility persists in recently issued
accounting standards: 1) the FASB’s adoption of a plan for international convergence of
accounting standards in 2002;3 2) an increasing focus on the balance sheet relative to focus on
the income statement; 3) provisions in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) that mandated corporate
funding for the FASB; 4) changes to the board composition of the FASB’s parent organization,
the FAF, in 1996; 5) a change in the nature of accounting standards; and 6) changes in the voting
rules of the FASB to pass new regulations (1990).
2.3.1 IFRS Convergence Project
Regarding the first change, the FASB has been working with the International
Accounting Standards Board (“IASB”) since 2002 with the objective of converging U.S. and
international accounting standards. The endeavor calls for the removal of differences between
international and U.S. standards to attain compatibility between the reporting regimes. Once
compatibility is achieved, uniformity is to be preserved when subsequent standards are issued. 4
As a result of this initiative, the FASB modified pre-existing accounting practices and continues
to collaborate with the IASB on new standards. For example, the way firms are now required to
report accounting changes and errors reflects how the convergence project affected pre-existing
3
4

FASB, Comparability in International Accounting Standards – An Overview.
FASB, Memorandum of Understanding (Norwalk Agreement).
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Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”). In order to reduce cross border financial
reporting differences arising from variations between IAS and FASB, FASB replaced APB No.
20 and FASB Statement No. 3 in 2005 with FASB Statement No. 154, “Accounting Changes and
Error Correction”. This new pronouncement mandated that voluntary changes in principle be
retrospectively applied and any necessary cumulative adjustments be reported on the balance
sheet. Such treatment contrasts with the previous method stipulated under APB Opinion No. 20,
‘Accounting Changes’, which required that for most voluntary changes in accounting
principle, the prior periods’ cumulative income effect was recognized with an adjustment on
the income statement. Therefore, the joint efforts between the two rule-making bodies is likely to
affect the nature of the standard setting process, potentially limiting the extent to which the
FASB can be influenced by its constituents and constraining the implementation flexibility
afforded to preparers.
2.3.2 Increasing Emphasis on Balance Sheet
The aforementioned example of SFAS 154 pertains to a change resulting from the
convergence project, but it is also consistent with the FASB’s increasing balance sheet oriented
approach (Dichev 2007), the second significant development since the 1995 study. This
development is evidenced by several major fair value pronouncements that have been issued
after the study period utilized by Balsam et al. (e.g., the “fair value” initiative is reflected in
SFAS 133 in 1999, SFAS 141 in 2001, SFAS 156 in 2006, and SFAS 159, etc.).
2.3.3 Structural Changes to the FASB Pursuant to SOX
In contrast to the previous two changes, the FASB has also undergone structural changes
since 1995. Originally, the FASB was established as an independent private rule-making body
6

accountable to the Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF), 5 but a significant portion of its
operating revenues were derived from donations made by the accounting profession and
preparers. While the FASB was expected to develop standards that prioritized the needs of
financial statement users, its reliance on funding from corporations and other constituents, who
frequently had conflicting interests, threatened its independence. Some openly questioned
whether the FASB would ever be sufficiently emboldened to bite the hand that fed it. 6 In 2002,
for example, net contributions from donors accounted for 25% of the organization’s operating
revenues and these contributions came predominately from two constituent groups -- preparers
(39% of the gross contributions) and the public accounting profession (46%). 7 Beginning in
2003, as a result of Section 109 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”), the financing of the
FASB’s operations changed.
SOX introduced a mandatory assessment on issuers of publicly traded securities to fund
the FASB’s operations, and the FASB discontinued receipts of nearly all contribution types. 8 As
The Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF) oversees the FASB. The FAF’s initial
responsibilities included the appointment of the FASB’s members, as well as the procurement
and allocation of its funds. Recent FAF Chairman, Robert E. Denham (2003-2008), reaffirmed
that “the FAF does not take positions on the FASB’s standards” in a letter to the SEC dated 2008
(http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-83.pdf). Although the FAF is prohibited from
interfering with the FASB’s standard setting process, it occasionally imposes its will, and whim,
on the FASB. The FAF trustees have strategically utilized their power, granted by the
organization’s by-laws, to change the FASB’s basic operational structure.
6
A 1993 BusinessWeek article reflected this sentiment as follows: “FASB's board is kept on a
short leash by corporate interests, which have too much influence over its funding and
membership” (“It’s Time to Free the FASB Seven” BusinessWeek, May 2, 1993).
7
From the FAF 2003 Financial Statements downloaded from
http://www.accountingfoundation.org/
8
Although the FAF increasingly diversified its funding sources over the years, particularly
through publication sales, it had relied heavily on corporate and public accounting firm
contributions to meet the FASB’s operational needs. The historical dependence on constituent
based funding raised questions about the board’s ability to issue standards that could potentially
alienate donors. Former FASB Chairman Dennis Beresford (1987-1997) informed Congress that,
7
5

a result of this change, the operating revenues for the FASB increased by 98% from 2002 to
2003 and the organization was no longer dependent on the discretionary financial support
derived from constituent groups. Among the potential implications of this change is less reliance
by the FASB on discretionary contributions from preparers and, therefore, enhanced
independence since 2003.
2.3.4 Reforms to the Composition of the FAF’s Trustees
Another structural change to the FASB was a reform of the FAF’s trustee composition.
Since the trustees appoint FASB board members, the constituent representation of the trustees
directly affects the organization’s standard setting process. 9 In 1987 (nearly the last year of
Balsam et al.’s 1995 study), a significant change was the addition of three trustees (out of
thirteen total on the board) with experience as financial officers of state or local governmental
on several occasions, companies threatened to withhold their contributions if a particular position
was adopted. (Former FASB Chairman Dennis Beresford speaking at a U.S. Senate Committee
Hearing on "Accounting and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other Public
Companies: Oversight of the Accounting Profession, Audit Quality and Independence, and
Formulation of Accounting Principles," February 26, 2002.)
9
The FAF trustees have strategically utilized their power, granted by the organization’s by-laws,
to change the FASB’s basic operational structure. Zeff (2005), for example, suggests that the
impetus for the FASB’s voting policy change in 1977 was the FAF’s desire to facilitate passage
of several standards (e.g., SFAS No. 16, No. 19 and No. 34) that could not be passed under the
pre-existing supermajority vote requirements. Similarly, Selling (2013) speculates that the FAF
had the same intentions when it altered the FASB’s bylaws in 2008, and then again in 2010 (Tom
Selling [2013] “The Financial Accounting Foundation Has Outlived Its Usefulness [As if it Ever
Was]”). Selling suggests that there is a pattern of FAF manipulation to ensure FASB trustees
promote the desired agenda. He points out, for example, that in an effort to streamline IFRS
adoption, in 2008 the FAF reduced the number of FASB members to 5, replaced super majority
voting requirements with simple majority, and empowered the Chairman to set the agenda. Then,
in 2010 to prevent fair valuing bank loans, Selling argues that the FAF again changed the
number of FASB members, added three new positions that were filled with people who could be
expected to reject fair value efforts, and replaced the former Chairman, Robert Herz, with an
opponent of fair value. One reason for the FAF’s pressure on the FASB stems from the fact that
the FAF’s trustees represent the interests of their respective constituencies, and the FAF had for
many years depended on financial contributions from those groups.
8

entities, and a reduction in the number of trustees representing the AICPA. The effect of these
changes was to dilute the relative power of all private interest constituent groups. Then, in 1998,
private interests were further diluted when, by eliminating one public accounting trustee and one
financial executive from the FAF’s board, the number of trustees was reduced from thirteen to
eleven. In 2002, five at-large members were included, bringing the total number of trustees to
sixteen. Members at-large were to be “individuals with business, investment, capital markets,
accounting, accounting and business education, financial, government, regulatory, investor
advocate or other experience.” 10 However, the most significant change happened in 2008 when
the by-laws eliminated the stipulations requiring a set number of trustees to be appointed from
each constituent group. Instead, the number of trustees was established at fourteen to eighteen.
Of these, three must be governmental trustees (financial officers or elected officials of state or
local governmental entities). The remaining trustees are to be members at–large.
The effect of these changes was to significantly reduce the number of trustees
representing preparers and auditors, while increasing the representation by the public and user
constituencies (Miller et al. 1998). These changes reduced preparer dominance and provided
other constituents with greater influence in the standard setting process. By reducing preparer
presence, the FASB enhanced its ability to resist that group’s influence.
2.3.5 Changes in Board Member Ideology
The fifth change relates to the effects imparted by the advancement of the FASB’s
conceptual framework. Chakravarthy (2014) presents evidence that after the issuance of
Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts (“SFAC”) No. 6 in 1985, a shift in board member
10

As per the FAF’s 2008 by-laws.

9

ideology occurred; FASB board members were more supportive of standards invoking the assetand-liability (A&L), or “fair-value”, view of accounting. Members were also more inclined to
deviate from positions held by their constituent sponsoring organizations in order to support fairvalue standards. Consequently, a change in the nature of standards occurred subsequent to 1985
as more standards advancing the fair-value perspective were issued.
2.3.6 Changes in the FASB’s Voting Process
A sixth change occurred in 2002 when the FAF changed the FASB’s voting process from
a supermajority to a simple majority vote.11 Since a supermajority vote gives more weight to
minority viewpoints, requiring a simple majority vote effectively expedites the promulgation of
new standards. If preparers have less ability to block or refine new pronouncements, then an
increase in pronouncements could mean less flexibility afforded to that constituency.
It is thus an open empirical question whether the implementation flexibility
characterizing FASB pronouncements has changed in the last 25 years. Therefore, I examine
whether Balsam et al.’s (1995) findings continue to hold—that is, do significant pronouncements
issued by the FASB continue to be characterized by implementation flexibility?
3. Prior Literature
3.1 Political Nature of Accounting Standard Setting
Prior research has examined the political nature of accounting standard setting. This
research is relevant to my study because it demonstrates the extent to which the FASB is
subjected to enormous pressure from multiple parties with diverse interests. Zeff (2005) provides

11

FASB Website: http://www.fasb.org/news/nr042402b.shtml
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descriptive evidence of the political landscape that characterizes the standard setting process by
reviewing the genesis of several accounting standards that were highly contentious (e.g., SFAS
No.’s 106, 115, 121, 123, 130, 133, and 141). For some of these standards, he chronicles how
Congressional and/or constituent pressures caused the FASB to modify its initial position. For
example, he recounts how although SFAS No. 115 requires that trading securities and availablefor-sale securities be reflected at their fair market values, the FASB originally intended for the
standard to be comprehensively applied to all investment types. Concerns over earnings volatility
led to pressure from the banking industry and Congress, which caused the FASB to relent.
Similarly, he describes how concessions were made by the FASB on SFAS No. 123, where the
final form of the standard only required disclosure of information without reporting an income
statement effect.
3.2 Political Influence Defined
Gipper et al. (2013) define political influence as a “purposeful intervention in the
standard-setting process by an economic entity with the goal of affecting the outcome of that
process to increase the entity’s economic value or wealth or achieve some other self-interested
purpose inconsistent with the FASB’s mission.” In their review of empirical research on the
politics of accounting standard-setting, they classify extant research into three major categories:
1) research on agenda setting of the FASB, 2) research on political lobbying via comment letters,
and 3) research on political lobbying that is more broad based than comment letters.
3.2.1 Agenda Setting
Regarding the first category, Allen (2013) studies the Financial Accounting Standards
Advisory Committee (FASAC) whose members, while not responsible for setting the FASB’s
11

agenda, influence the agenda nevertheless. 12 In particular, she documents which FASAC
constituent representatives shape the FASB’s agenda and notes a pivotal change; from 1981 to
2001, the FASAC’s big-N auditor representatives hold the greatest influence, while, from 2002
to 2006, it is the financial constituents who wield the most power in shaping the FASB’s agenda.
Other influence over the agenda setting process is suggested by Leftwich (1995) who argues that
the SEC has a significant role in the process.
3.2.2 Lobbying – Comment Letters
Lobbying, the second of Gipper et al.’s (2013) categories, has been defined as actions
taken by interested parties to influence a rule making body (Sutton 1984). Prior literature on the
role of lobbying via comment letters in standards setting includes the work of Watts and
Zimmerman (1978) who document that large firms which are highly regulated, or subject to
significant political scrutiny, lobby for standards that reduce their reported income in order to
minimize their political costs. Brown and Feroz (1992) examine corporate comment letters and
find that the FASB is responsive to the views expressed therein. Francis (1987) finds that a
firm’s decision to lobby is affected by both firm size and the potential for adverse financial
statement consequences. The effect of a standard on executive compensation also motivates
firms to participate in the standard setting process. Dechow et al. (1996) finds that firms opposed
expensing stock options when it represented a significant component of executive compensation.

The primary function of the FASAC is to advise the FASB on issues related to projects on the
agenda (FASB.com/fasac/).
12
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3.2.3 Lobbying - Other
Other research on political lobbying includes Ramanna (2008) who examines the role
lobbying has on influencing Congressional support of an accounting standard. He finds evidence
consistent with PAC funding influencing politicians’ positions at four Congressional intervention
events leading up to SFAS No. 141 and SFAS No. 142. Allen and Ramanna (2013) examine
SEC commissioner characteristics, and FASB board member attributes, on proposed standards.
They find that FASB members with backgrounds in financial services are more inclined to
propose standards that increase relevance, and decrease reliability.
In contrast to empirically based lobbying studies that revolve around particular standards,
Elbannan and McKinley (2006) attempt to synthesize prior findings and explain firm decisions to
resist or support FASB standards from an organizational theory perspective. They assert that
standard setting is a political process, that certain standards are more likely to elicit corporate
reactions than others, that certain FASB constituents will lobby extensively when they perceive
the impact of a proposed standard to affect them adversely, and that corporate action is likely to
have a greater impact on the FASB than user interests. Elbannan and McKinley (2006) then
identify three determinants of firms’ decisions regarding whether to support a standard: the
standard itself, the firm, and the firm’s industry.
Cortese (2011) examines the role of capture theory during the oil and gas accounting
standard setting process of the 1970’s. Capture theory argues that regulators will become
beholden to the groups that they regulate (Posner 1974). She argues that private industry’s
control over the FASB’s process demonstrates how the FASB’s independence was compromised
early in the organization’s existence.
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Mellman and Seiler (1986) examine the FASB’s first 85 standards to identify if there is a
uniform structure in pronouncements, and find that, while structures appear to exist, they lack
uniformity. Balsam et al. (1995b) find that mandatory accounting pronouncements are structured
to minimize the FASB’s political costs by affording managers with implementation flexibility.
Balsam et al. (1995a) examine whether the stock market differentiates between the
implementation effects of standards that pass through the income statement, and those that
circumvent it. If the market treats both approaches identically, then the reporting flexibility
afforded to firms would not translate into stock price benefits. However, they find a positive
correlation between abnormal returns in the twelve months surrounding mandatory adoption of
standards that impact the income statement, but no such association between stock returns when
the standard’s effect is on the balance sheet. This finding reinforces the initial findings of Balsam
et al. (1995b) by demonstrating that firms directly benefit from implementation flexibility that
permits losses to be redirected to the balance sheet.
4. Methodology
From the population of FASB promulgations issued between 1989 and 2013, I select a
sample of significant pronouncements for further analysis. Pronouncements are deemed
significant if they impart pervasive effects on the financial statements of S&P 500 firms, or if
their aggregate financial impact is large.
To discern which pronouncements meet either of these two criteria, I perform several
procedures. First, I search for significant pronouncements by manually scrutinizing the financial
statements of the S&P 500 firms in order to identify those pronouncements that effected changes
to the Income Statement, or to the Statement of Shareholders’ Equity between 1989 and June
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2014. Next, I perform queries by Accounting Standards Update (“ASU”) and Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards (“SFAS”) numbers on Edgar Online’s I-Matrix, and
Morningstar’s Document Research 10-K Wizard as a further check to ensure that my sample is
complete. Because both Edgar Online’s I-Matrix and Morningstar’s Document Research 10-K
Wizard permit comprehensive searches of SEC filings using Boolean operators, I am able to
capture the full effect of pronouncements, even when companies reference the same
pronouncement differently (e.g., SFAS No. 158 is also cited as ASC 715, and other
promulgations are referred to by ASU number, ASC topic number, or SFAS number).
Next, I examine the extent to which the standards in my sample provide managers with
implementation flexibility (i.e., discretion in adoption timing). This determination requires a
reading of each standard’s implementation guidelines. Generally, the FASB issues standards that
require implementation no later than a specified date, but they frequently also permit early
adoption, or adoption within a multi-year window. For example, SFAS No. 106, “Employers'
Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions”, requires firms with a calendar
year-end to adopt the standard no later than 1993, but it also permits implementation in any of
the three preceding years. In contrast, other standards such as SFAS No. 125, “Accounting for
Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities”, and No. 128
“Earnings per Share”, explicitly forbid early adoption and provide no implementation window.
In order to determine whether the FASB provides different implementation flexibility for its
more significant standards, I identify the adoption timing policies for all FASB standards
(including ASU’s) issued from 1989 to mid-2014, and then compare the policies of the standards
in my sample to the implementation policies of the remaining standards. This test permits me to
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identify whether the FASB provides disparate implementation timing policies for its more
significant standards.
After examining the adoption timing policies afforded by the FASB to financial statement
preparers, I examine the transition methods availed by the significant standards. Historically,
mandated accounting pronouncements have required firms to implement new standards utilizing
one of the following methods: 1) retroactive (APB No. 20) or retrospective (SFAS No. 154), 2)
retroactive/catch up, 3) catch-up, and 4) prospective. As discussed previously, the distinction
between these four approaches relates to the manner in which transition adjustments are reflected
in the financial statements:

Method

Restatemen
t of Prior
Years’
Financials

Nature of Transition Adjustment

Balance
Sheet
Oriented
Transitio
n
Yes

Income
Statement
Oriented
Transitio
n
No

Retroactive
-orRetrospective

Yes

Effects of changes are shown as
adjustments to retained earnings in
the earliest year presented.

Retroactive/
Catch-up

Yes

Effects of changes are recognized as
a cumulative change to the earliest
income statement presented.

No

Yes

Catch-up

No

Effects of changes are recognized as
a cumulative change to the current
period’s income statement.

No

Yes

Prospective

No

None, effects are prospective.
Effects of change are recognized and
disclosed in the current and
subsequent periods affected.

Yes

Yes

To identify the implementation method required by the standards in my sample, I read
through the text of each. Although this process reveals the relative frequency of various
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implementation methods, it does not provide insight into whether the FASB’s adoption policies
are deliberately chosen to minimize political costs. Therefore, to determine whether
implementation policies are strategically prescribed, I compare the implementation policies of
the standards in my sub-sample to the remaining (non-significant) promulgations.
One way of minimizing the political costs associated with standards is to permit
recognition of equity increasing changes on the income statement, while relegating equity
decreasing changes to the balance sheet. To test for this possibility, I extend the scope of my
tests to identify whether there are systematic implementation differences for equity increasing
and equity decreasing pronouncements. To quantify the equity effect of the mandated
pronouncements, I manually review the financial statements for those firms comprising the S&P
500 index on December 31, 2000. I select firms from the year 2000 because it is the midpoint of
the years spanned by the population of standards issued during the years 1988 to 2014. I also
perform a search of XBRL tags using XBRL.US’ C-Suite to ensure completeness. Finally, I
disaggregate equity-increasing and equity-decreasing changes and separately test whether
implementation policies differ depending on the directional effects or the magnitude of the
mandated standards.
5. Sample Selection
Balsam et al.’s (1995b) study investigated significant accounting standards issued from
1973 through 1987 (i.e., SFAS’s No. 1 to No. 96). I update their time horizon by considering
subsequent standards issued through June 2014 (i.e., SFAS’s No. 97 to No. 168, and Accounting
Standard Updates [ASU’s] No. 2009-01 to No. 2013-12). During this period, the FASB
promulgated 75 SFAS’s (including revisions such as 123R, 132R, and 141R), and 83 ASU’s.
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Similar to Balsam et al. (1995b) I examine only a subset of these promulgations. My sample is
restricted to include FASB standards and codification updates that directly affected publicly
traded firms’ financial statements through changes in recognition and measurement values.
Pronouncements that primarily affect not-for-profit, or other non-publicly traded firms such as
defined benefit plans, are not considered in this study (e.g., SFAS No’s 99, 110, 116, 117, 124,
126, 136, 164; ASU’s 2009-06, 2010-07, 2012-05, 2013-03, 2013-04, 2013-06, 2013-09, 201402 and 2014-03). Similarly, I also exclude standards that serve primarily to defer, or rescind, the
implementation of previously issued standards (e.g., SFAS No’s 100, 103, 108, 111, 127, 135,
137, 139, 145; ASU’S 2010-10, 2011-01, and 2011-12), those whose provisions are voluntary
(SFAS No. 159), and those that essentially codify pre-existing SFAS’s to ASU’s (e.g., 2009-01,
2009-16, and 2009-17). The FASB Codification includes SEC Updates as ASU’s. I also exclude
these from my sample since they are imposed by the SEC and therefore do not emerge from the
FASB’s due process (e.g., ASU 2009-03, 2009-04, 2009-07, 2009-08, 2009-09, 2009-10, 200911, 2010-03, 2010-04, 2010-05, 2010-12, 2010-14, 2010-19, 2010-21, 2010-22, and 2012-03).
Next, I remove promulgations that either principally modify the disclosure requirements of preexisting standards (e.g., SFAS No.’s 102, 104, 118, 132, 132R, 161, 165), primarily introduce
new presentation and disclosures (SFAS No.’s 105, 107, 119, 123, 128, 129, 130, 131; ASU
2010-06, 2010-20, 2010-29, 2011-04, 2011-05, 2011-09, 2011-11, 2013-01,2013-02, 2013-11),
or amend previously established GAAP (e.g., SFAS No.’s 98, 114, 122, 134, 138, 140[1], 141,
141R, 144, 147, 148, 149, 151, 153, 155, 156, 160; ASU 2009-15, 2010-09, 2010-13, 2010-17,
2011-03, 2011-08, 2012-02, 2013-08).
I then further eliminate all standards that do not have broad implications, either because
they relate to specialized principles or practices, or because they are industry specific. The
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pronouncements that prescribe specialized practices are frequently denoted as “Consensus of the
FASB Emerging Issues Task Force” (e.g., ASU 2009-13, 2009-14, 2010-01, 2010-18, 2010-25,
2010-26, 2010-27, 2012-06, 2013-05, 2013-07, 2014-01, 2014-04, 2014-05). The few industry
specific standards applied to casinos, health care entities, insurance, regulated enterprises, and
the film industry (e.g., SFAS No’s 97, 101, 113, 120, 163;ASU 2010-16, 2010-23, 2010-24,
2011-06, 2011-07, 2012-01, and 2012-07).
Promulgations that mainly provide working definitions, establish an accounting
framework, or clarify accounting treatment related to pre-existing GAAP are excluded as well
(e.g., SFAS No.’s 154, 157, 162, 168; ASU 2009-05, 2009-12, 2010-02, 2010-11, 2010-15,
2010-28, 2011-02, 2011-10, 2013-10, and 2013-12). Similarly, technical corrections that rectify
unintended application of guidance, or “that represent narrow and incremental improvements to
U.S. GAAP” are also eliminated (e.g., ASU 2009-02, 2010-08, 2012-04, 2012-06), as are those
pronouncements that are not broad based because they pertain to specialized principles and
practices (e.g., SFAS No.’s 125, 152; ASU No. 2009-13, 2009-14, 2010-01, 2010-18, 2010-25,
2010-26, 2010-27, 2012-06, 2013-05, 2013-07, 2014-01, 2014-04, 2014-05). Finally, I exclude
several additional pronouncements for miscellaneous reasons, other than the aforementioned
(e.g., SFAS No.’s 121, 146 and 150).13

I exclude these standards for the following reasons: A cumulative effect type charge to income
is only required for SFAS No. 121 in rare circumstance when long-lived assets “held-fordisposal” at the time of adoption are impaired. Among the 500 firms in my sample, only three
recorded cumulative effect type charges upon adopting; SFAS No. 146 primarily introduced a
prospective change that affected the timing of liability recognition, and SFAS No. 150 generally
resulted in balance sheet only reclassifications (only seven firms in my sample recognized a
cumulative effect type change).
13
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By utilizing the above sample construct (see Table 1), I arrive at an initial sample size of
11 financial accounting standards. However, I expand the initial sample to include both FASB
Staff Position (“FSP”) 13-2, “Accounting for a Change or Projected Change in the Timing of
Cash Flows Relating to Income Taxes Generated by a Leveraged Lease Transaction”, and FIN
48, “Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes an interpretation of FASB Statement No. 109”,
thereby bringing the final sample size to 13 standards.
Although FSP 13-2 is not a SFAS, it was nevertheless issued by the FASB and had a
significant financial statement impact. It reduced sample firms’ retained earnings by nearly $5
billion. Given the significance of this FSP, I include it in the sample. Similarly, FIN 48 is also
not a SFAS but I include it in my sample because it introduced pervasive financial statement
effects.
The 13 standards selected for this study include SFAS No.’s 106, 109, 112, 115, 123R,
133, 142, 143, 158, 166 and 167, FSP 13-2 and FIN 48. These standards are further described in
Appendix A.
Table 2 summarizes the transition methods availed by SFAS and ASU promulgations.
Excluding those pronouncements that deferred or rescinded the effective dates of previously
issued statements, pertain to non-public entities, non-mandatory pronouncements, and those that
mainly clarify definition or frameworks, there were 112 SFAS & ASU’s issued by the FASB
during the period from which I selected my sample pronouncements. Of these 112, exclusive use
of the prospective transition method was required by 71 standards. Of the 41 remaining standards
that required alternative implementation methods, my sample accounts for more than 25%. Table
3 summarizes the implementation attributes associated with all the standards in my sample.
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6. Results
6.1 Principle Findings
Balsam et al. (1995b) had previously documented a pattern in which accounting
standards allowed firms to record positive transition adjustments as increases to income, but
negative adjustments as decreases to equity. Using an updated sample of significant accounting
standards, I find no evidence that the implementation methodologies for recent accounting
standards continue to exhibit a similar prejudice. My results also suggest that, beginning in 2006,
a paradigm shift occurred in transition practices. Subsequent to 2006, the location impact of
standards shifted away from the income statement, and towards the balance sheet. However,
despite these changes, I find that standards continue to afford firms with adoption timing
flexibility.
The standards examined in this study were issued over a period of more than 20 years and
reflect a diverse spectrum of implementation methodologies. Of the thirteen standards that were
examined, nine were formally issued Statements of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS’s),
and two were issued by the FASB either as Financial Interpretations (e.g., FIN 48) or as Staff
Positions (e.g., FSP 13-2). Table 3 summarizes the transition mechanisms observed across all of
the firms in my sample.
6.2 Implementation Method Flexibility
With regard to implementation method flexibility, four of the eleven SFAS’s permitted
firms to choose between alternative implementation methods (SFAS No.’s 106, 109, 123r, and
166/167). In contrast, the remaining nine standards in my sample did not provide firms with any
choice regarding implementation method. This proportion, 4 out of 11 standards, is not dissimilar
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to Balsam et al.’s (1995b) findings. Of the 11 standards in their study, only 3 permitted more
than one implementation method.
6.3 Implementation Timing
Next, I analyze the extent to which significant standards offer adoption timing flexibility.
Balsam et al. (1995b) found that this flexibility permitted firms to opportunistically adopt
standards coincident with performance metrics (e.g., ROA, and leverage). First, I examine
whether the adoption windows offered by significant standards differ from other standards. Then,
I compare the average adoption window for the significant standards in my study to that of
Balsam et al. (1995b).
The population of standards from which I sub-selected my sample of standards is 158
(see Table 1). However, of these 158 standards, only 112 are relevant when considering adoption
timing flexibility. This is because 46 pronouncements served only to defer or rescind the
effective dates of previously issued statements, pertained to non-public entities, were nonmandatory pronouncements (e.g., SFAS No. 159), or mainly clarified definitions or frameworks.
Table 4 tabulates the frequency of early adoption provisions across these 112 standards. Among
the standards in my sample, the percentage permitting early adoption is approximately 64%. This
contrasts with a rate of just 54% for the remaining 101 standards. However, this disparity is
eliminated once SEC updates are excluded from consideration. Thus, it does not appear that early
adoption is a distinguishing attribute of the significant pronouncements in my sample.
With regard to multi-period adoption flexibility, Table 5 reveals that the FASB offers
firms more timing flexibility for significant standards. Multi-year adoption windows provide
firms with an average implementation period of 2.36 years for these standards, compared to just
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1.47 years for those not in my sample. Similar to the 2.50 year window associated with the
standards selected in Balsam et al.’s (1995b) study, the average adoption window for the
standards in my sample is 2.36 years.
Although I do not find any differences in adoption timing flexibility, I do observe a
temporal change. Of the thirteen standards in my sample, seven offered calendar year firms an
early adoption option (SFAS 106, 109, 112, 115, 123r, 133, and 143) while six standards did not
(SFAS No. 142, 158, 166/167, FIN 48, and FSP 13-2). 14 However, it appears that
implementation timing flexibility for significant standards has decreased since 2006; of the 8
standards in my sample issued before 2006, all but one standard offered multi-period adoption,
while none of the 5 standards issued in 2006 or beyond permitted such treatment. One potential
explanation for this change is that less implementation timing flexibility was required as
transition adjustments shifted from the income statement to the balance sheet. In the next section
I present findings that suggest that such a shift occurred—the location of transition adjustments
moved from the income statement to the balance sheet.
6.4 General Implementation Effects and Firm Choice
Table 6 summarizes the financial statement effects of each significant standard issued
since 1990 on S&P 500 constituent firms. The implementation effects of 6 standards were
recognized by sample firms on their income statement as non-negligible cumulative effect type
changes (I exclude SFAS No. 123r from this count because it only affected 4 firms in my
sample). These adjustments combined to reduce income by approximately -$192 billion.

SFAS No.’s 142, 158, FIN 48 and FSP 13-2 permit early adoption but this option is not
effectively available to calendar year filers.
14
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Notably, the majority of the 6 standards that affected income were not income increasing, but
instead were income decreasing. Just 2 standards that affected firms’ income statements
generated non-negligible increases to income, and in the aggregate those two standards inflated
firms’ net income by just $12 billion. In contrast, the 4 income decreasing standards reduced
firms’ income by -$206 billion. Although this pattern seems counter to expectations based on the
findings of Baslam et al. (1995b), the observations could be a manifestation of firms’
implementation preferences, and not a reflection of changes in standards setting. This is because
firms might be choosing income reducing adoption methods, even when alternative methods are
available. Therefore, it is important to consider whether the income reducing standards provided
implementation flexibility.
I look at the 4 income decreasing standards to identify if those standards permitted
alternative implementation methods. If so, then the observed income reductions might reflect
firms’ reporting preferences instead of a shift in standards setting. Two standards accounted for a
substantial portion of the overall negative adjustments to income; SFAS No. 106 (-$91.6 billion)
and SFAS No. 142 (-$106.6 billion) combined to reduce net income by -$198 billion. For those
two standards, the FASB afforded very little implementation flexibility insofar as diverting the
negative adjustments from income. The FASB did allow firms to amortize the SFAS No. 106
transition obligation over multiple future years, but the impact to the income statement could
only be deferred, not redirected to another financial statement. SFAS No. 142 was even less
flexible because it mandated that the transition adjustment be recognized exclusively as a
cumulative effect adjustment to income. Neither of the other two standards that decreased
income (SFAS No.’s 112 and No. 133) offered an alternative implementation methodology.
Thus, firms that recorded large, negative transition adjustments on their income statements
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generally did not have an option that would have permitted the amounts to be recognized
elsewhere instead.
The implementation effects of the remaining standards, whose transition adjustment did
not impact net income, were recognized either as a direct adjustment to retained earnings (4
standards), a separately stated equity adjustment (1 standard), or as an adjustment to OCI or
APIC (3 standards).15 With the exception of SFAS No. 115 and SFAS No. 123r, the transition
adjustments for each of those standards were characterized by net negative adjustments.
Therefore, for all the standards examined in this study, only four did not require a net
negative transition adjustment. Among the four standards that required positive adjustments, two
were manifested as cumulative effect type changes on firms’ income statements. However, the
other two standards—including the one that introduced the second largest positive adjustment
(SFAS No. 115)—were not routed through net income. Instead, those standards’ transition
adjustment required an adjustment to equity.
6.5 Implementation Location Financial Impact
Following the methodology utilized by Balsam et al. (1995b), I analyze whether the
directionality of the required transition adjustments dictates the location of the adjustment
(balance sheet vs. income statement). Table 7 categorizes the number of transition effects each
standard imposed on the income statement and balance sheet. In cases where a standard
introduced multiple equity effects for a particular firm, I reflect this as just one adjustment. Of
the 1,610 total transition effects, 743 (46%) appeared on the income statement, and 867 (54%)
One standard, SFAS No. 133, had the potential to affect both Net Income and OCI depending
on the nature of the transition.
25
15

were recognized on the balance sheet. The total negative adjustments represented 72% of the
total adjustments [(537+626)/1,610]. Interestingly, the proportion of negative adjustments
flowing through the income statement was nearly identical to the proportion of negative
adjustments that flowed through the balance sheet. Of the 743 income statement adjustments,
72% recorded negative adjustments (537/743). Similarly, of the 867 balance sheet adjustments,
72% (626/867) were negative. These results contrast starkly with Balsam et al. (1995) who found
a large disparity between these rates. They documented that just 12.9% of the income statement
adjustments were negative, compared to 89% of the balance sheet adjustments.
I summarize the number of negative effects appearing on the income statement for each
standard (Table 8). I also provide the magnitude of the adjustments (mean and median), and the
relative effects of the adjustments as a percentage of income. To compute the relative effects, I
scale the negative adjustments by the absolute value of income before extraordinary items
(obtained from Compustat). Utilizing a Z-score test with a 50% benchmark, I test whether the
frequency of each negative standard appearing on the income statement is statistically
significant. Of the six standards that reduced income (SFAS 123r is excluded because it only
affected the income of 4 firms) the frequency of income reducing effects is greater than 50% for
4 standards. These standards include SFAS No. 106, 112, 133 and 142. Only one standard
(SFAS No. 109) that flowed through the income statement was more likely to appear as a
positive adjustment than a negative one. Overall, the frequency of adjustments appearing on the
income statement that imposed negative adjustments, relative to positive adjustments, is found to
be significantly greater than 50% (Z=12.14).
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I perform a similar analysis on the equity reducing adjustments. Table 9 summarizes this
information. Of the 7 standards that effect equity (I exclude SFAS No. 109 because it only
affected the equity of 2 firms), 4 were more likely to appear as negative adjustments than as
positive. Two equity adjusting standards were more likely to appear as positive adjustments
(SFAS No. 115 and 123r). Overall, equity adjustments were more likely to be negative than
positive (Z=13.08).
Comparing the mean effects of the negative adjustments reveals that the negative
adjustments on the income statement were larger than the negative adjustments on the balance
sheet. For example, the mean adjustment for negative income statement adjustments was -408
million compared to -285 million for the equity adjustments. Similarly, the scaled adjustments
indicate that the average negative adjustment to net income was 144% of income before
extraordinary items in contrast to the negative equity adjustments that were only 13% of total
unadjusted equity.
6.6 Shift in Reporting Location (2006)
A time series analysis of the implementation methodologies offered by significant
accounting standards is presented in Table 10. This table suggests that firms’ implementation of
recent standards has shifted from the income statement, and are increasingly equity oriented. For
example, of the five standards in my sample that were issued in 2006 or later, none permitted the
transition adjustment to flow through the income statement but instead required that they be
recognized by retrospective restatements or by equity adjustments. Notably, the impact of each
of these five standards was negative, and all averted recognition on the income statement. While
this might be interpreted as evidence of a reversion to former standards setting policy, it should
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be duly noted that two of those standards were not SFAS’s (e.g., Fin 48, and FSP 13-2).
Nevertheless, those recent five standards were by no means small; SFAS No. 158 had the largest
cumulative economic impact of all the standards in my sample, FIN 48 affected the second most
number of firms, and SFAS No. 166/167 had the second largest mean firm effect.
Using 2006 as a “transition” year, I bifurcate the transition impacts of my sample
standards to further explore the apparent shift in implementation policies around 2006. Table 11
demonstrates that approximately the same number of firms passed negative transition
adjustments through their income statement in the pre-2006 period, as in the following period.
Segregating the standards also reveals that prior to 2006 the number of positive and negative
adjustments flowing through the balance sheet was relatively similar (56% and 43%,
respectively). However, in years 2006 and beyond the percentage of negative adjustments
flowing through the balance sheet was 79% compared to 0% for the income statement. Looking
at the magnitude of these adjustments reveals that prior to 2006 the mean adjustments were
largely negative and passed through the income statement, whereas after 2006 the adjustments
continued to be largely negative but passed through the balance sheet instead. The mean
adjustment flowing through the income statement prior to 2006 was -269 million, while the
negative adjustment flowing through the balance sheet subsequent to 2006 was only slightly
smaller at -231 million. This suggests that a shift in the location of mandated transition
adjustments occurred in 2006.
6.7 Discussion of Observed Shift Around 2006 (APB No. 20 and SFAS No. 154)
One potential explanation for the apparent shift in implementation methods circa 2006 is
that the FASB changed its perspective on accounting for changes in accounting principles.
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Historically, APB No. 20 had called for changes in accounting principles to be recognized in the
period of adoption by recording a cumulative effect type change to net income. Eight sample
standards were issued prior to 2006, the year in which APB No. 20 was superseded by SFAS No
154. Six of these 8 standards either required a cumulative effect type adjustment to net income,
or made this transition approach optional. This suggests that standard setters were cognizant of
the transition guidance promulgated by APB No. 20. However, the fact that 2 of the standards
did not allow for a transition adoption by cumulative effect adjustment to net income suggests
that APB No. 20 did not unequivocally dictate transition methods. Moreover, several of the
standards that did require a cumulative effect type adjustment to net income also offered
alternative adoption approaches that were inconsistent with APB No. 20. For example, SFAS
No. 106 offered a prospective transition adoption option even though APB No. 20 reserved
prospective treatment for changes in accounting standards when the cumulative effect cannot be
determined, or for changes in estimates. Similarly, the FASB expressed a preference for
requiring retroactive restatement upon adoption of SFAS No. 109 but also permitted a second
choice—a cumulative effect adjustment to net income—because of the hardship that
restatements impose on firms. Meanwhile, SFAS No 115 did not require a transition adjustment
to net income, nor did SFAS No. 123r. Thus, although the provisions of APB No. 20 might have
influenced implementation methodologies, the FASB clearly did not steadfastly adhere to them.
Deviations from APB No. 20’s guidelines can be attributable to practical considerations,
as well as to efforts to mitigate adversity associated with new standards. These variances are
manifested as implementation flexibility, and the explanatory language found in SFAS No. 112
acknowledges several factors that give rise to it: 1) minimizing implementation costs, 2)
mitigating disruption, 3) maintaining the integrity of the financial statements, and 4) the
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magnitude of the transition effect. These priorities are corroborated in the explanatory text of
several pronouncements. For example, the magnitude of a standard’s effect is clearly cited as a
consideration by the FASB in the explanatory language of SFAS No. 106 and SFAS No. 112. In
Table 12, I summarize the explanations provided for/against various implementation options as
expressed in the appendices of the promulgated standards.
As illustrated in Table 12, in several statements the FASB expressed its preference for
retroactive restatement because of that method’s ability to preserve inter-period comparability.
However, due to both practical constraints and the anticipated hardship it would impose on firms
(or because historical estimates are required) this option is often not mandated. For example, for
SFAS No. 106 and No. 109, the FASB refrained from requiring retroactive restatement, citing
impracticability and recognizing the onerous burden associated with restating prior period’s
reports. These same concerns also precluded the FASB from requiring adoption of SFAS No.’s
115, 133, and 143 by retroactive restatement. Nevertheless, the fact that the FASB considered
various alternative implementation methods for multiple standards confirms that the FASB was
not tied to the methodologies advocated by APB No. 20.
The implementation guidance prescribed by APB No. 20 was superseded by SFAS No.
154 in 2006. Among the significant changes introduced by SFAS No. 154 was a requirement
that voluntary changes in accounting principle were henceforth to be recognized by retrospective
application with a corresponding adjustment to opening retained earnings. In unique cases where
retrospective application is impracticable, prospective application is to be utilized instead.
However, the standard further stipulated that this approach is only applicable to new (mandatory)
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accounting standards when standards do not specify an alternative implementation method. Thus,
SFAS No. 154 continued to permit implementation flexibility on a standard-by-standard basis.
Looking at the standards issued once SFAS No. 154 was in force reveals that 3 out of 5
did not permit retrospective adoption as called for under SFAS No. 154. However, the
explanatory notes (see Table 12) for these 3 standards reveal several reasons for the exceptions
including hardship, impracticability, and concerns regarding consistency issues. Adoption
approaches incongruous with SFAS No. 154 were also considered. The notes to SFAS No. 158
provide a clear example of how the financial impact of a standard led the FASB to deviate from
SFAS No. 154’s provisions: “the Board decided not to require retrospective application of the
changes after learning about the significant costs that some employers would incur in
retrospectively revising financial statements of previous periods.” Additional flexibility was
afforded under SFAS No. 166/167 which allowed firms to record the required transition either as
a cumulative effect adjustment to retained earnings in the period of adoption, or by restatement
of prior period financial statements. Therefore, while the observed shift in implementation
methodologies could be attributable to the advent of new guidance (SFAS No. 154), that
guidance did not compel standard setters to offer a particular adoption methodology.
6.8 Relationship between Magnitude of Transition and Implementation Method
One possible explanation for the observed changes in implementation methods relative to
Balsam et al.’s (1995b) findings (and also a potential explanation for the observed shift circa
2006) is that transition methodologies are sensitive to the financial impact of the anticipated
adjustments. I explore this possibility by examining whether adoption flexibility is associated
with the magnitude of firm effects imparted by mandated standards. Table 13 presents the
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ranking of each sample standard by magnitude of impact. Sorted in descending order by overall
impact, as measured by the number of S&P 500 firms affected, Table 13 reveals that SFAS No.
158, FIN 48 and SFAS No. 106 had the greatest impact. No clear adoption pattern emerges by
examining the implementation policies of these three standards because each of these standards
calls for a different transition adoption mechanism. SFAS No. 158 required the transition
adjustment to flow through OCI, FIN 48 called for a cumulative adjustment to opening retained
earnings, and SFAS No. 106 required an income statement adjustment. Among standards ranked
#4-#6, two required an adjustment to income, and one standard permitted such treatment but did
not mandate it. Looking at the standards that affected the fewest number of firms also does not
reveal any systematic pattern regarding implementation policy. Those four standards that
affected the fewest number of firms cannot be characterized by any particular implementation
methods due to variation in adoption mechanisms; SFAS 115, 123r, 143, and FSP 13-2 required
adoption by cumulative effect to net income, cumulative effect to equity, and cumulative effect
to retained earnings. In summary, ranking the standards by impact based on the number of firms
affected does not reveal any clear transition adoption policies. Similarly, no clear patterns
emerge when rankings are performed by standards’ cumulative economic effect, or by their mean
effects.
Next I rank the standards based on the average scaled firm effect. I compute this by
scaling each firm’s transition adjustment by the absolute value of income before extraordinary
items and other adjustments (derived from Compustat). Using this measure, it is apparent that
just 2 of the 5 most negative adjustments offer flexibility with regard to implementation
methods.
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Collectively, these observations do not suggest that the implementation mechanisms of
recently issued mandated accounting are dictated by either the scale or scope of the required
transition adjustments.
6.9 Summary of Findings
I find that mandated pronouncements continue to offer flexibility with regard to
implementation timing. Early and multi-year adoption windows remain prevalent. However, my
findings are inconsistent with presumptions that standards discriminate between financial
statement locations depending on the directional effects of the required transition adjustments.
Of the six standards in my sample that affected the income statement, only two increased
earnings. The net impact of these standards was to reduce firms’ earnings by $192 billion.
Meanwhile, although negative adjustments were also manifested on the balance sheet, their
magnitude was much smaller prior to 2006. After 2006, the negative adjustments aggregated
$153 billion, but appeared exclusively on firms’ balance sheets as reductions to equity. Because
the mean negative adjustment to the income statement prior to 2006 exceeded the mean negative
balance sheet adjustment in the post 2005 period, it does not appear that this shift in
implementation location is a function of magnitude. Ranking the standards by financial effect
also does not provide any evidence that implementation method is size dependent.
7. Conclusion
In this study, I examine whether mandatory accounting standards offer implementation
flexibility. This question was first explored by Balsam et al. (1995b), who observed that
mandated accounting standards afforded managers significant implementation flexibility. In
particular, they found that standards issued by the FASB permitted firms to record positive
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transition adjustments as increases to income but negative adjustments as decreases to equity.
Because numerous structural and environmental changes have occurred since that study was
performed, I re-examine whether the previously documented flexibility continues to characterize
recent accounting standards.
I identify 13 significant standards for further analysis from the population of
pronouncements issued by the FASB since 1990 (1989 was the last year surveyed in Balsam et
al. [1995]). Standards were deemed significant if they imparted pervasive effects on the financial
statement of S&P 500 firms, or if their aggregate impact on these firms was large. Upon
implementation of these standards, the transition adjustments recorded to firms’ equity (e.g.,
Retained Earnings, OCI, APIC, etc.) exceeded -$153 billion and the cumulative effect
adjustments to net income were (-$192) billion.
Unlike Balsam et al. (1995b), I do not find evidence that mandated accounting standards
continue to be characterized by positive adjustments/increases to income and negative
adjustments/decreases to equity. Moreover, recent accounting pronouncements appear to have
little implementation flexibility with regard to both timing, and transition alternatives. Thus, it
appears that a paradigm shift has occurred in the implementation practices of mandated
accounting standards.
One interpretation of this is that the FASB is now less concerned with mitigating its
political costs. The implications of this are that, as a body, the FASB is potentially a more
objective standard setter than it once was. This increased independence could enable the FASB
to better curb aggressive accounting practices. For example, 5 standards in my sample required
prior period income to be reversed out as a cumulative effect adjustment to income, while just 2
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standards’ had transition adjustments that were income increasing. The differential in magnitude
between the income increasing and income decreasing pronouncements was stark; reductions
were $213 billion, while increases to income were just $19 billion. This is consistent with a
greater autonomy that enables the FASB to issue standards that redress past aggressive
accounting practices.
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to identify the cause(s) for the documented
changes in implementation flexibility, it could be a result of one of several structural and
environmental changes that have occurred in recent years. For example, the adoption of SOX
arguably gave the FASB greater autonomy as the organization was no longer reliant on voluntary
contributions for funding. The impetus could also be attributed to one or more changes that
affected the standard setting environment, including: changes in the FASB’s board/trustee
composition, the path toward convergence with IFRS, greater emphasis on the balance sheet
relative to the income statement, a change in the nature of pronouncements to reflect a fair-value
bias, and changes in the FASB’s voting rules. Future studies, therefore, might be able to draw a
direct correlation between these broader changes to the FASB as an organization and the specific
changes to the flexibility of accounting standards.
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Appendix A: Detail of Standards Selected for Sample
SFAS No. 106: Employers' Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions

This standard established accounting standards for postretirement benefits other than pensions. It required companies to
accrue for future costs in the years that employee services were rendered, thereby discontinuing the preexisting “pay-as-yougo” practice. Pearson et al. (1995) observe that the economic and social impact of this pronouncement was “staggering”. For
example, they report that as a result of adopting SFAS 106, General Motors recorded a one-time charge of $20.8 billion. Other
companies modified their health care plans by changing or reducing costly benefit provisions. Because of the costs and
disruption to pre-existing practices, the standard was highly contested by industry.

SFAS No. 109: Accounting for Income Taxes
SFAS No. 109 called for an asset and liability approach for financial accounting and reporting of income taxes. Although the
Standard amended pre-exiting SFAS No. 96, “Accounting for Income Taxes”, it was still significant in its own right. For
example, the implementation of SFAS No. 109 caused IBM to adjust net income by $1.9 billion.
SFAS No. 112: Employers' Accounting for Postemployment Benefits—an amendment of FASB Statements No. 5 and 43
SFAS No. 112 requires companies to accrue workers’ compensation, disability, severance pay and other postemployment
benefits not covered under SFAS’s No. 106 or No. 87.
SFAS No. 115: Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities

SFAS No. 115 is consistent with the FASB’s fair value agenda. The standard addresses how marketable securities are
classified, and valued. In particular, it requires that investments be classified into three categories based on management intent
(held-to-maturity, trading, and available-for-sale). Trading securities and available-for-sale securities are presented on the
balance sheet at fair market value, while debt securities classified as held-to-maturity are reflected at amortized cost. Changes
in market value for trading securities affect earnings, whereas value changes for available-for-sale securities are manifested
only as equity adjustments. To initially account for unrealized gains and losses on available-for-sale securities, a separate
equity account is established when SFAS No. 115 is adopted.
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SFAS No 123r: Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation

This standard was amongst the FASB’s most controversial. Although the FASB’s intention was to require firms to expense
the fair value of their stock based employee compensation, this objective was scuttled by intense political pressure. As issued
in October 1995, the standard only required firms to report the fair values as a footnote. Consequently, SFAS No. 123 had no
direct effect on either the balance sheet or on net income. In December 2004, the FASB issued SFAS No. 123r. This standard
revised SFAS No. 123 by requiring mandatory expensing of stock based compensation.

SFAS No. 133: Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities
This standard provides accounting guidance for derivatives and hedges. It requires companies to present derivative
instruments on the balance sheet at market value, and also to provide significant disclosures regarding the objectives of each
derivative used.
SFAS No. 142: Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets

SFAS No. 142 provides accounting treatment for goodwill and other intangible assets. In particular, the standard terminated
the practice of amortizing goodwill, and also required firms to perform an annual test for impairment of goodwill. For some
firms, the impact of this standard was staggering. For example, pursuant to this standard AOL Time Warner recorded a $54
billion write-off in 2001.

SFAS No. 143: Accounting for Asset Retirement Obligations
SFAS No. 143 provides guidance on recording asset retirement obligations (ARO) associated with tangible long-lived assets.
The standard requires firms to record a liability for the fair value of anticipated removal and restoration costs, with a
corresponding increase to the long-lived assets’ carrying value.
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SFAS No 158: Employers’ Accounting for Defined Benefit Pension and Other Postretirement Plans—an amendment of
FASB Statements No. 87, 88, 106, and 132(R)

Existing GAAP had called for the funded status of postretirement plans to be disclosed in financial statement footnotes. SFAS
No. 158 requires that the content of these footnotes be reported as assets or liabilities, thereby moving the funded status of the
plan to the balance sheet. The asset or liability to be reported is computed as the difference between the plan’s projected
benefit obligation and the fair value of the plan’s assets. The initial adjustment, and subsequent changes to these balance sheet
accounts, are to be included with other comprehensive income.

SFAS No. 166 & 167: Accounting for Transfers of Financial Assets—an amendment of FASB Statement No. 140 & SFAS
No. 167 - Amendments to FASB Interpretation No. 46(R)

Collectively, SFAS No. 166 and No. 167 establish whether securitizations and other transfers of financial vehicles are
required to be reported on the balance sheet. SFAS No. 166 eliminates the concept of a special-purpose entity, and modifies
the rules pertaining to derecognition of financial assets. It also requires increased disclosure of financial asset transfers,
including transactions involving securitizations. SFAS No. 167 provides quantitative guidance in order to determine whether
consolidation of a variable interest entity is required. As a result of these two standards, many existing securitizations were
required to be reconsolidated onto the balance sheet. This is because securitizations that were formerly included in vehicles
referred to as qualified special purpose entities (QSPE’s) could no longer receive off balance sheet treatment once SFAS
No.166 eliminated QSPE’s. For some firms, the impact of these standards were massive. For example, the retained earnings of
Bank of America, Citigroup, J.P. Morgan Chase were collectively reduced by nearly $19 billion.

FSP 13-2: Accounting for a Change or Projected Change in the Timing of Cash Flows Relating to Income Taxes Generated
by a Leveraged Lease Transaction
This FASB Staff Position (FSP) addresses how a change in income tax related cash flows arising from a leveraged lease
transaction affects financial reporting. Principally, FSP 13-2 requires a recalculation of lease income when the timing of
income tax cash flows associated with a leveraged lease change. Upon adoption, the cumulative effect of the change is to be
reported as an adjustment to beginning retained earnings.
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FIN 48: Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes an interpretation of FASB Statement No. 109

SFAS No. 109 called for an asset and liability approach for financial accounting and reporting of income taxes. Inconsistent
application of this standard led to “non-comparability in reporting income tax assets and liabilities.” The FASB issued FIN 48
in order to increase transparency and reduce uncertainty in accounting for income taxes. According to an analysis performed
by Audit Analytics, the cumulative effect on retained earnings resulting from FIN 48 adoption exceeded $3 billion
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Appendix B: The Historical Context of the FASB and its Relationship to Standards Setting
The Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB") was founded in 1973 as a private
sector, non-governmental organization responsible for establishing and improving financial
accounting and reporting standards. 16 Although the U.S. Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provide statutory authority for the SEC to establish financial
accounting and reporting standards, the SEC has assumed more of an oversight role since 1938
when, while maintaining ultimate authority, they voted to rely on the public accounting
profession to develop private sector accounting standards (Van Riper 1994). The FASB was
formally provided with limited accounting rule-making authority by the SEC in 1973, just a few
months after its creation.17
The Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF) oversees the FASB. The FAF’s initial
responsibilities included the appointment of the FASB’s members, as well as the procurement
and allocation of its funds. Although the FAF is prohibited from interfering with the FASB’s
standard setting process, it occasionally imposes its will, and whim, on the FASB. 18 The FAF
trustees have strategically utilized their power, granted by the organization’s by-laws, to change
the FASB’s basic operational structure. Zeff (2005), for example, suggests that the impetus for
the FASB’s voting policy change in 1977 was the FAF’s desire to facilitate passage of several

FASB Website: http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/LandingPage&cid=1175805317407. The
FASB was incorporated on June 30, 1972 and replaced the APB on July 1, 1973 pursuant to an
AICPA declaration that occurred several months prior (May 1972).
17
The FASB's authority to promulgate accounting standards in the United States derives from
Accounting Series Release No. 150 (December 1973), which was also incorporated into the
SEC's Financial Reporting Release No. 1.
18
Recent FAF Chairman, Robert E. Denham (2003-2008), reaffirmed that “the FAF does not
take positions on the FASB’s standards” in a letter to the SEC dated 2008
(http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-573/4573-83.pdf).
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standards (e.g., SFAS No. 16, No. 19 and No. 34) that could not be passed under the pre-existing
supermajority vote requirements. Similarly, Selling (2013) speculates that the FAF had the same
intentions when it altered the FASB’s bylaws in 2008, and then again in 2010. 19 One reason for
the FAF’s pressure on the FASB stems from the fact that the FAF’s trustees represent the
interests of their respective constituencies, and the FAF had for many years depended on
financial contributions from those groups.
Although the FAF increasingly diversified its funding sources over the years, particularly
through publication sales, it had relied heavily on corporate and public accounting firm
contributions to meet the FASB’s operational needs. This financing structure was eventually
reformed when the Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002) replaced voluntary contributions with mandatory
support fees. However, the historical dependence on constituent based funding raised questions
about the board’s ability to issue standards that could potentially alienate donors. Former FASB
Chairman Dennis Beresford (1987-1997) informed Congress that, on several occasions,
companies threatened to withhold their contributions if a particular position was adopted. 20
While the FASB was expected to develop standards that prioritized the needs of financial
statement users, its reliance on funding from corporations and other constituents, who frequently
Selling suggests that there is a pattern of FAF manipulation to ensure FASB trustees promote
the desired agenda. He points out, for example, that in an effort to streamline IFRS adoption, in
2008 the FAF reduced the number of FASB members to 5, replaced super majority voting
requirements with simple majority, and empowered the Chairman to set the agenda. Then, in
2010 to prevent fair valuing bank loans, Selling argues that the FAF again changed the number
of FASB members, added three new positions that were filled with people who could be
expected to reject fair value efforts, and replaced the former Chairman, Robert Herz, with an
opponent of fair value.
20
Former FASB Chairman Dennis Beresford speaking at a U.S. Senate Committee Hearing on
"Accounting and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other Public Companies:
Oversight of the Accounting Profession, Audit Quality and Independence, and Formulation of
Accounting Principles.", February 26, 2002.
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had conflicting interests, threatened its independence. Some openly questioned whether the
FASB would ever be sufficiently emboldened to bite the hand that fed it. A 1993 BusinessWeek
article reflected this sentiment as follows: “FASB's board is kept on a short leash by corporate
interests, which have too much influence over its funding and membership.” 21
Although the FASB reports directly to the FAF, the FAF itself is overseen directly by the
Securities and Exchange Commission, which bestows upon the FASB express authority
(Financial Reporting Release No. 1, Section 101, and reaffirmed in an April 2003 Policy
Statement).22 This subjects the FASB to SEC oversight as well. The SEC declared in Accounting
Series Release 150 ("ASR 150") that pronouncements of the FASB "will be considered by the
Commission as having substantial authoritative support." Because the FASB depends on the SEC
for authority, it must issue standards in-line with the SEC’s expectations.
The SEC's support is vital but has not always been unconditional. For example, the 1976
Metcalf report concluded that it would be beneficial for the federal government to establish
financial accounting standards instead of the private sector. Among the reasons cited for this
proposal was the SEC's historical delegation of responsibility to private sector organizations that
were typically governed by self-interests. The Metcalf Report concluded that the SEC's failure to
directly exert its full authority on accounting matters has "caused a serious erosion of public
confidence in the accuracy and usefulness of information reported by corporations” (Metcalf
Report: The Accounting Establishment, 1976).

21
22

It’s Time to Free the FASB Seven. BusinessWeek, May 2, 1993.
http://www.sec.gov/rules/policy/33-8221.htm
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The SEC has, on extremely rare occasions, gone so far as to publicly undermine the
FASB's authority. For example, on August 31, 1978 the SEC reversed the FASB's Financial
Accounting Standard No. 19, "Financial Accounting and Reporting by Oil and Gas Producing
Companies," with their own pronouncement, Accounting Series Release ("ASR") No. 253
(Benjamin and McEnroe 1983), and, in 1996, SEC Chair Arthur Levitt posed an existential threat
to the FASB when he publicly considered revoking the Board's rule making authority (Miller et
al. 1998). And, as recently as 2009, congressional legislation was introduced to transfer
accounting standard setting oversight authority from the SEC to a newly created Federal agency.
Other examples include the SEC’s decision to “urge” the FASB to abandon its stock option
proposal after hundreds of corporate executives visited the office of former SEC Chairman
Arthur Levitt (Levitt later reminisced that “it was probably the single biggest mistake I made in
my years at the SEC….”), and its refusal to approve the FASB’s budget in 2007 until the FASB
consented to certain governance changes. 23,24 To avoid such public conflicts of interest, the SEC
and the FASB practice a policy of “mutual non-surprise". However, as John Burton, former
Chief Accountant of the SEC (1972-1977), noted, “This does not seem to work 100%.” 25
At the very least, relying on the support of the SEC potentially impairs the FASB's ability
to operate independently and, at times, has influenced the organization's standard setting agenda.
Palmon et al. (2011) provide some evidence regarding the extent to which the FASB's agenda is
influenced by the SEC. They categorize the apparent interaction between the SEC and the FASB
Arthur Levitt’s comments are from a transcript of Frontline’s “Congress and the Accounting
Wars”, which was broadcast on PBS:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/regulation/congress/
24
http://ww2.cfo.com/accounting-tax/2007/04/sec-used-budget-to-strong-arm-fasb/
25
The SEC and the Changing World of Accounting, John C. Burton, Chief Accountant,
Securities and Exchange Commission. January 17, 1974
23
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leading up to each of the first 157 FASB pronouncements. Palmon et al.’s (2011) classification
suggests that approximately 20% of the pronouncements studied either derived from subject
matter initiated by the SEC, or emanated from SEC disclosure requirements. Historically, there
have also been several occasions (e.g., SFAS 1, 4, 13, and 109) when the SEC has publicly
asserted its dominance over the FASB by threatening to act if the FASB did not (Palmon et al.
2011).
Thus, the inherent structure by which the FASB derives its authority from the SEC can
impose serious operational constraints. The FASB, therefore, must pay heed to the necessary
maintenance of power sharing between itself and the SEC.
Another aspect of this maintenance of power relates to the FASB’s budget. In 2002, the
introduction of SOX was intended to make the FASB more independent as is clear in the
following statement by Senator Enzi [R-WY]:
We did something marvelous for the FASB. We made sure of its independence. One way
we made sure of its independence, besides citing it in the law, was to make sure FASB
has independent funding. They will not have to come to Congress with a budget. And
they will not have to go to corporate American for funding. They will get independent
funding to be able to do the job they need to do. That will inhibit us from trying to change
what they are doing in setting accounting standards (148 Cong Rec. S7355 [Jul. 25,
2002]).26

However, unstated in this assertion is the fact that SOX contains a provision requiring that the
SEC review the FASB’s annual budget, which undermines the intended independence of the
FASB.27 For example, in 2007, the SEC delayed approving the FASB’s budget until the FAF

Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 Conference Report:
http://lobby.la.psu.edu/_107th/134_Stock_Option_Expensing/Congressional_Statements/Thomas
/S_Gramm_etal_072502_2.htm
27
SOX specifies that the SEC has authority to review the FASB’s budget. The SEC has
interpreted this term as empowering them to approve the budget. The FASB has questioned this
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agreed to grant it a greater governance role.28 In particular, the SEC insisted that it be allowed to
review, and nominate, both current and prospective FASB members and FAF trustees. 29 Thus,
the SEC’s control over the budget, while itself a great impediment to the FASB’s independence,
further allows the SEC to exert influence in other realms of the FASB’s structure.
Moreover, the FASB’s budget appears to be a point of contention for more than just the
SEC. The U.S. Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) included “mandatory
appropriations” and “mandatory outlays” for the FASB as part of the 2013 Federal budget, and
further concluded that the FASB is subject to sequestration, even though SOX stipulates that,
“accounting support fees and other receipts of the Board and of such standard-setting body shall
not be considered public monies of the United States.” 30,31
In addition to considering the SEC’s influence, the FASB also has to maintain the support
of its constituents who may not be supportive of the standards promoted by the organization. One
practice, citing the fact that the Act seems to make a semantic distinction by specifying the term
“approve” for the PCAOB support fee, and using the term “review” for the FASB’s accounting
support fee. (http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/fasb041805.pdf)
28
SEC Is to Get More Sway Over FASB; Board's Foundation Gives Regulator Input On
Appointments. Wall Street Journal. March 28, 2007. P. C1
29
Even prior to SOX, the SEC exerted its influence in the selection of FASB members, although
less formally. SEC Policy Statement, April 25, 2003 (http://www.sec.gov/rules/policy/338221.htm#P59_9942) references several documents, including press releases and annual reports,
that assert precedence (e.g., SEC Press Release No. 96-87, SEC Annual Report 1996, and
FAF 1996 Annual Report of the Financial Accounting Foundation). David Beresford, former
Chair of the FASB posted on a listserve, “Are you aware that the FAF runs its selections for
FASB Board members by the Chairman of the SEC who would have an effective veto right if
she were not satisfied with the Trustees' selection? (I am personally aware of this veto having
been exercised once.)” http://listserv.aaahq.org/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=AECM;ae9f0e0e.1307D
Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, Section 109 (e).
Correspondence dated July 15, 2013 from the FAF to the Federal Accounting Standards
Advisory Board.
30
31
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commonly accepted reason for the demise of the FASB’s predecessor organizations, the
Accounting Principles Board (“APB”) and the Committee on Accounting Procedure (“CAP”),
was their perceived lack of a broadly based mandate for authority. 32 The CAP was comprised
exclusively of part time members from the American Institute of Accountants and its
pronouncements were not binding. Because the CAP did not have representatives on its board
from diverse constituent groups, or a specific grant of authority from the SEC, it failed to achieve
broad based support and was dissolved after only 21 years (1938-1959). 33 The CAP’s successor,
the Accounting Principles Board (“APB”), was also not endorsed by the SEC and managed to
survive just 14 years (1959-1973). In an effort to avoid the fate that befell its predecessors, the
FASB introduced significant changes to differentiate itself from the APB and CAP. These
changes resulted from recommendations made by the Wheat Committee which had been
established in 1971 by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants to address
criticism of the standards setting process. In particular, the recommendations provided for the
establishment of the FASB as an independent, self-regulating rule making body with a
participative form of governance.
The diverse constituent groups are represented by FASB board members who are
appointed by trustees of the FAF. The FAF’s trustees represent diverse user and preparer groups
drawn from the accounting, financial, government, and academic sectors. When the FASB was
formed in 1973, the FAF’s nine trustees were selected from lists submitted by five “nominating
organizations”: the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), the American
Accounting Association (AAA), the Financial Analysts Federation (FAF), the Financial
32
33

Miller et al. 1998. p.58
Werntz, W. History of the accounting procedure committee--from the final report.
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Executives Institute (FEI), and the National Association of Accountants (NAA). These nine
trustees appointed the FASB’s initial seven members. Over the years, as reflected in
modifications to the FAF’s bylaws in 1978, 1987, and 1998, the sponsoring organizations
changed, as did the number of trustees each nominating organization could appoint to the FAF’s
board. For example, in 1978, the number of trustees was changed to ten; Four were to be
certified public accountants (nominated by the AICPA), three were to be financial executives
(two nominated by the FEI, and one nominated by the NAA), one analyst (nominated by the
FAF), one investment banker (nominated by Securities Industry Association (SIA)), and one
educator (nominated by the AAA). But in 1978, the board size was changed from nine to eleven,
and in 1987 (nearly the last year of Balsam, et al.’s 1995 study), the size was increased further to
thirteen. A significant change made in 1987 was the addition of three trustees with experience as
financial officers of state or local governmental entities, and a reduction in the number of trustees
representing the AICPA.
The effect of these changes was to dilute the relative power of all private interest
constituent groups. In 1998, private interests were further diluted when, by eliminating one
public accounting trustee and one financial executive from the FAF’s board, the number of
trustees was reduced from thirteen to eleven. In 2002, five at-large members were included,
bringing the total number of trustees to sixteen. Members at-large were to be “individuals with
business, investment, capital markets, accounting, accounting and business education, financial,
government, regulatory, investor advocate or other experience.” 34

34

As per the FAF’s 2008 by-laws.
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However, the most significant change happened in 2008 when the by-laws eliminated the
stipulations requiring a set number of trustees to be appointed from each constituent group.
Instead, the number of trustees was established at fourteen to eighteen. Of these, three must be
governmental trustees (financial officers or elected officials of state or local governmental
entities). The remaining trustees are to be members at–large.
Because trustees are responsible for electing FASB members, the FASB’s due process
ensures that multiple groups, with diverse interests, can influence the standard setting process.
Inviting participation from a broad coalition of interested parties helps the FASB to maintain a
broad base of implied authority from constituents. However, since constituents promote their
self-interests, and no standard affects all constituents equally, the increased participation in
standard setting added a greater political dynamic to this process.
Shortly after its formation, the FASB issued Financial Accounting Concept Statement
No. 1, which prioritized the needs of financial statement users relative to the needs of the
preparers.35 This statement perpetuated the intra-constituent conflict between preparers and users
of financial reports. While preparers invariably bear a large portion of the implementation costs,
users disproportionately derive the benefits. The direct implementation costs imposed on
preparers by new standards arise from the preparation, certification and dissemination of
information (Leuz and Wysocki 2008). Although the FASB considers these implementation costs
in conjunction with an overall cost benefit analysis (SFAC No. 8), the costs are generally easier
An AICPA study group, referred to as the Trueblood Committee, considered the objectives of
financial reporting and put forth recommendations that were instrumental in the FASB’s
establishment of a conceptual framework. The Trueblood Committee’s major objectives were
incorporated by the FASB in 1978 with the release of SFAC No. 1.
35
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to quantify than the benefits.36 In addition to implementation costs, the costs of new standards
also include the potentially deleterious effects on firms’ earnings, and the imposition of personal
costs on managers who might suffer a reduction in bonus compensation from a negative effect on
earnings. Other costs to preparers include both proprietary and opportunity costs. The cumulative
effect of these factors creates a burden that falls heavily on preparers.
The FASB recognizes this difference, but declares that “the objectives of ﬁnancial
reporting serve many different information users who have diverse interests, and no one
predetermined result is likely to suit all interests” (SFAC No. 2). The FASB’s former Chairman
Dennis Beresford summarized the perspective of financial information constituents as follow:
In general, the issuers [of financial reports] want few standards, or only very broad
standards, with plenty of room for the exercise of judgment in their application, auditors
are inclined to want more standards, and more specific ones, that will defuse differences
of opinion with clients, and users want a maximum of reliable, relevant information.
Despite the different interests, SFAC No. 2 reflects the FASB’s intention to remain neutral when
formulating or implementing standards so that the primary concern “should be the relevance and
reliability of the information that results, not the effect that the new rule may have on a particular
interest.”
Nevertheless, the disparate effects of new accounting standards on users, preparers,
auditors and the public foster the pursuit of self-interests among constituent groups, and
influence standard setting. Therefore, it is difficult for the FASB to remain entirely impervious to
the concerns of its constituents, or to objectively evaluate the social and economic consequences

Diana J. Scott and Wayne S. Upton, “The Role of Cost-Benefit Considerations in the FASB’S
Standards-Setting Process,” in Benefits, Costs, and Consequences of Financial Accounting
Standards (FASB Special Report), 1991.
49
36

of a new standard given its participatory governance structure. The FASB’s sensitivity to the
concerns of its constituents is evident in its responsiveness to corporate comment letters. 37 For
example, after approximately 1,700 mostly negative comment letters were received by the FASB
in response to a proposal that would have required mandatory expensing of stock options, the
FASB ultimately capitulated to constituent pressure and issued a modified pronouncement
(SFAS 123, and Miller et al. 1998):
The debate on accounting for stock-based compensation unfortunately became so divisive
that it threatened the Board's future working relationship with some of its constituents.
Eventually, the nature of the debate threatened the future of accounting standards in the
private sector (paragraph 60 of SFAS 123, found in Miller et al. 1998).

The language of this final pronouncement clearly reflects the extent to which the FASB
perceives constituent support as imperative.

Several years after retreating from their stock options proposal, the FASB proposed
another highly contested standard. This standard called for derivatives to be presented on the
balance sheet at fair market value. Opposition to this proposal was fierce, with the CFO of
Norwest Corp. going so far as to submit written comments to a Congressional House
Subcommittee hearing arguing that, if effective, the standard could “have a dramatic impact on
how American businesses compete and operate, and in turn, ultimately affect the American
consumer.”38 Following on the heels of the controversial stock options proposal, The Wall Street

Comment letters are received by the FASB from constituents in response to proposed
accounting changes. The FASB recognizes the contents of these letters as an important source of
information regarding constituents' views. Source:
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/SectionPage&cid=1218220137090
38
http://democrats.financialservices.house.gov/banking/10197jtt.shtml
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Journal suggested that “If the FASB were humbled a second time, its loss of credibility might
spur the Securities and Exchange Commission to take over the job.” 39
In particular, maintaining the support of corporate constituents is especially challenging
since these constituents bear a large portion of the costs associated with new accounting
pronouncements, while the financial statement users invariably accrue the benefits. Although the
FASB includes a cost/benefit analysis as part of the due process FASB Chairman Dennis R.
Beresford (1987-1997) observed that financial statement preparers form an organized and
relatively homogenous group that is highly active in the Board's due process (Beresford and Van
Riper, 1992). In 1997, Citicorp Chairman and CEO John S. Reed called for the FASB to be
scrapped altogether, and some companies challenged the authority of the FASB by privately
discussing whether to ignore FASB provisions. 40 Thus, the cost-benefit inequity between
preparers and users leads to subjectivity in the FASB’s calculus when evaluating standards
despite the organization’s desire to maintain neutrality (SFAC 2).
Congress empowers the SEC and, therefore, by assigning a function to the FASB that is
defined in a federal statute, the SEC has also extended Congressional support to the organization.
Arthur Levitt, former Chairman of the SEC wrote an Op-Ed piece in the New York Times in
which he lamented about “Congressional pressure, which is often applied when powerful
corporations seek to undermine new accounting rules.”41 On numerous occasions Congress has
sought to influence the standard setting process (e.g., oil and gas standards in the 1970’s,
Corporate America Targets FASB for the Second Time. The Wall Street Journal, September
11, 1997.
40
Corporate America Is Fed Up With FASB, Businessweek, April 20, 1997.
41
Levitt, Arthur. Who Audits the Auditors? New York Times. January 17, 2002.
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/17/opinion/who-audits-the-auditors.html.
39
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accounting for business combinations, fair valuation of equity and debt instruments, and
distressed instruments on bank balance sheets, etc.). This situation can be traced back to the early
years of the FASB, when Congress meddled in the formulation of Oil and Gas Exploration Cost
standards, and does not appear to have abated. Just two years after Congress approved SOX
(2002) provisions that increased the FASB’s independence, corporate pressure incentivized
members of Congress to introduce legislation that would have usurped the FASB’s authority.
The bill called for the SEC to “not recognize as `generally accepted'” the FASB’s final standard
on equity compensation.42 Robert Herz, former Chairman of the FASB (2002-2010), testified at a
Congressional subcommittee hearing that he construed the bill as a “signal that Congress is
willing to intervene in the independent, objective, and open accounting standard-setting process
based on factors other than the pursuit of sound and fair financial reporting.” 43 The FASB
ultimately abdicated, but former FASB Chairman Dennis Beresford stated that it “`caved’ only
under congressional pressure that would have effectively legislated it out of business.” Similarly,
members of the House Financial Services Committee quickly reminded Robert Herz, former
FASB Chairman (2002-2010), that the FASB’s authority and independence are ephemeral:
“Don't make us tell you what to do," said Rep. Randy Neugebauer (R-Tex.). "Just do it.
Just get it done." Said Rep. Gary L. Ackerman (D-N.Y.): "If you don't act, we will." 44

Aside from strong-arming the FASB, members of Congress considered dissolving the FASB as
the private sector rule making body on no less than three occasions. In the 1970’s two

H.R. 3574; H.R. 1372
Testimony of Robert H. Herz Chairman Financial Accounting Standards Board Before the
Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the
Committee on Financial Services, June 3, 2003
44
Levitt, Arthur. Changing Rules Undercuts Investor Confidence. Washington Post, March 26,
2009. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/03/25/AR2009032502805.html
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Congressional reports, prepared by the Moss and the Metcalf subcommittees, advocated for the
SEC to replace the FASB, and in 2009 legislation was proposed to establish the Federal
Accounting Oversight Board (FAOB), which would have approved and overseen accounting
principles and standards.45
All of these participants—the constituents, the FAF, the SEC and Congress—rationally
seek to influence the FASB in accordance with their self-interests, and since every standard has
an economic effect, new standards will always engender some opposition. Thus, although the
FASB was established as an independent body, its reliance on constituents for financing and on
the U.S. Congress and the SEC for formal recognition and support, have historically imposed
operational constraints on the standard setting process. 46 This process is by nature a political one
(Solomons 1978 and Zeff 2005), and increased opposition to standards increases the FASB’s
political costs, which undermines its authority. Consequently, the FASB seeks to minimize its
political costs.

H.R. 1349 (111th) Federal Accounting Oversight Board of 2009
To enhance independence, the FASB answers directly to the Financial Accounting Foundation,
its members are full time employees, and they are required to sever all ties with all former
employers.
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Table 1 - Sample Construct
Total Pronouncements issued [SFAS 97 to ASU 2014- 06]
Amendments to previous promulgations
Amendments to previous promulgations with disclosure requirements
Defers the effective date of a prior pronouncement
Industry specific
Introduce presentation or disclosures
Mainly clarifies definition or frameworks
Not mandatory
Other
Pertains to non-public entities
Rescission of previous pronouncements
SEC Updates
Specialized principles or practices
Technical Correction
Preliminary sample size
Other pronouncements (not SFAS or ASU)
Final sample Size

158
25
7
8
12
18
14
1
6
17
4
16
15
4

147
11
2
13
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Table 2 - Transition Mechanisms for Accounting Pronouncements

Transition Mechanisms
Catch-Up
Catch-Up & OCI
Catch-Up or Prospective
Catch-up or Retroactive
Cum Adj to Beg RE
Cum Adj to Beg RE & Equity
Cum Adj to Beg RE, or Prospective
Cum Adj to Beg RE, or
Retrospective

Modified Prospective or Modified
Retrospective
Modified Prospective or Retroactive
Other Comprehensive Income (OCI)
Prospective
Prospective or Retroactive
Prospective or Retrospective
Retroactive
Retroactive disclosures
Retrospective

Significant
Pronouncements
3
1
1
1
0
1
0

Not
Significant
1
1
0
0
5
0
2

4
2
1
1
5
1
2

Sig Prncmt
% of Total
75%
50%
100%
100%
100%
-

2

1

3

67%

1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
1
0
72
1
4
2
3
8

1
1
1
72
1
4
2
3
8

100%
100%
-

11
10%

101
90%

112
100%

Total

Note: This table excludes pronouncements that only deferred or rescinded the effective dates of
previously issued statements, pertain to non-public entities, non-mandatory pronouncements (e.g.,
SFAS No. 159), and those that mainly clarified definitions or frameworks. ASU 2009-01, 2009-16,
and 2009-1 7are also excluded because they pertain to codification.
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Table 3 - Implementation Attributes by Standard
Calendar Year Filers

SFAS

Description

106

Employers'
Accounting
for
Postretirem
ent Benefits
Other Than
Pensions

109

Accounting
for Income
Taxes

Issued

Mandatory
Implement
ation Date

12/1/1990

Fiscal years
beginning
after
December
15, 1992.

2/1/1992

Fiscal years
beginning
after
December
15, 1992.

Early
Implementa
tion Option

Yes

Yes

Early
Implement
ation
Years

1990,
1991, 1992

1991, 1992

Mandatory
Implementation
Years

1993

1993

Range of
Possible
Adoption

1990-1993

1991-1993

Yea
rs
in
Ra
nge

Implement
Option 1

4

Cumulative
Effect of
Change on
Net Income

3

Cumulative
Effect of
Change on
Net Income

Implement
Option 2
Report the
transition
obligation on
the statement
of financial
position, and
recognize it
on the
statement of
income by
amortizing it
over plan
participants'
future service
periods.
Retroactive
Restatement
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Table 3 - Implementation Attributes by Standard
Calendar Year Filers

SFAS Description
Employers'
Accounting
for
Postemploy
ment
112
Benefits

115

Accounting
for Certain
Investments
in Debt and
Equity
Securities

Early
Implementa
tion Option

Early
Implement
ation Years

Mandatory
Implementation
Years

Range of
Possible
Adoption

Yea
rs
in
Ra
nge

Issued

Mandatory
Implement
ation Date

11/1/1992

Fiscal years
beginning
after
December
15, 1993

Yes

1992, 1993

1994

1992-1994

3

5/1/1993

Fiscal years
beginning
after
December
15, 1993

Yes

1993

1994

1993-1994

2

Implement
Option 1
Cumulative
Effect of
Change on
Net Income
Retained
Earnings and
also
Cumulative
effect of
change to
Equity
(treatment
depends on
the nature)

Implement
Option 2

N/A

N/A
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Table 3 - Implementation Attributes by Standard
Calendar Year Filers

SFAS Description

123r

Share Based
Payment

Issued

12/1/2004

Mandatory
Implement
ation Date
FASB: The
first interim
or annual
period
beginning
after June
15, 2005.
SEC:
deferred to
first quarter
of the first
fiscal year
beginning
after June
15, 2005

Early
Implementa
tion Option

Yes

Early
Implement
ation Years

Mandatory
Implementation
Years

Range of
Possible
Adoption

Yea
rs
in
Ra
nge

2004, 2005

2006
The SEC deferred
the FASB's
implementation
date from 2005 to
2006.

2004-2006

3

Implement
Option 1

Implement
Option 2

Modified
Retrospective

Modified
Prospective
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Table 3 - Implementation Attributes by Standard
Calendar Year Filers

SFAS Description

133

Accounting
for
Derivative
Instruments
and
Hedging
Activities

142

Goodwill
and Other
Intangible
Assets

Mandatory
Implement
ation Date

Early
Implementa
tion Option

Early
Implement
ation Years

Mandatory
Implementation
Years

Range of
Possible
Adoption

Yea
rs
in
Ra
nge

6/1/1998

Fiscal years
beginning
after June
15, 2000
(reflects one
year delay).

Yes

1998, 1999,
2000

2001

1998-2001

4

6/1/2001

Fiscal years
beginning
after
December
15, 2001

Yes, but
effectively
not for
calendar year
filers

Issued

N/A

2002

2002

1

Implement
Option 1
Cumulative
Effect of
Change on
Net Income
AND also as a
cumulative
effect of
change on
Other
Comprehensiv
e Income
(treatment
depends on
the nature of
the derivative
instrument).
Cumulative
Effect of
Change on
Net Income

Implement
Option 2

N/A

N/A
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Table 3 - Implementation Attributes by Standard
Calendar Year Filers

SFAS Description
143

158

166
&
167

Accounting
for Asset
Retirement
Obligations

Employers'
Accounting
for Defined
Benefit
Pension and
Other
Postretireme
nt Plans
Accounting
for
Transfers of
Financial
Asset; and
Amendment
s to FASB
Interpretatio
n No. 46R

Issued

Mandatory
Implement
ation Date

6/1/2001

Fiscal years
beginning
after June
15, 2002

9/1/2006

Fiscal years
ending after
December
15, 2006

6/1/2009

Fiscal years
beginning
after
November
15, 2009

Early
Implementa
tion Option

Early
Implement
ation Years

Mandatory
Implementation
Years

Range of
Possible
Adoption

Yea
rs
in
Ra
nge

Yes

2001, 2002

2003

2001-2003

3

Cumulative
Effect of
Change on
Net Income

1

Cumulative
effect of
change on
Other
Comprehensiv
e Income

N/A

Cumulative
effect of
change on
Retained
Earnings

Retrospectiv
e application
with
cumulative
adjustment to
retained
earnings of
the earliest
period
presented

Yes, but
effectively
not for
calendar year
filers

No

N/A

N/A

2006

2010

2006

2010

1

Implement
Option 1

Implement
Option 2
N/A
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Table 3 - Implementation Attributes by Standard
Calendar Year Filers

SFAS Description
Accounting
for
FIN
Uncertainty
48
in Income
Taxes
Accounting
for a
Change or
Projected
Change in
the Timing
of Cash
FSP
Flows
13-2
Relating to
Income
Taxes
Generated
by a
Leveraged
lease
Transaction

Issued
6/1/2006

7/13/2006

Mandatory
Implement
ation Date
Fiscal years
beginning
after
December
15, 2006

Early
Implementa
tion Option
Yes, but
effectively
not for
calendar year
filers

Fiscal years
beginning
after
December
15, 2006

Yes, but
effectively
not for
calendar year
filers

Early
Implement
ation Years

Mandatory
Implementation
Years

Range of
Possible
Adoption

Yea
rs
in
Ra
nge

N/A

2007

2007

1

N/A

2007

2007

1

Implement
Option 1
Cumulative
effect of
change on
Retained
Earnings

Cumulative
effect of
change on
Retained
Earnings

Implement
Option 2
N/A

N/A
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Table 4 - Early Adoption Provisions by Pronouncement Type
Pronouncement Category
Significant Pronouncements
Non-Significant Pronouncements*
SEC Updates
Total

Yes
7
55

No
4
24

62
55%

28
25%

Effective
Grand %
at Issue Other Total Yes
11 64%
5
2
86 64%
15
15
0%
20
2
112 55%
18%
2% 100%

* - Excluding SEC pronouncements.
Note 1: Effective at Issue indicates that the pronouncement had no transition period
(immediate effect).
Note 2: This table excludes pronouncements that only deferred or rescinded the
effective dates of previously issued statements, pertain to non-public entities, nonmandatory pronouncements (e.g., SFAS No. 159), and those that mainly clarified
definitions or frameworks. ASU 2009-01, 2009-16, 2009-17 also excluded because they
pertain to codification.
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Table 5 - Average Number of Implementation Years by Pronouncement Type
Pronouncement Category
Significant Pronouncement
Amendments to previous promulgations
Amendments to previous promulgations with
disclosure requirements
Introduce presentation or disclosures
Industry Specific
Other
Specialized principles or practices
SEC Updates
Technical Correction
Total

Pronouncements
11
25

Average Years
to Implement
2.36
1.56

18
12
4
15
16
4
112

1.44
1.83
1.67
1.80
1.00
1.00
1.57

7

1.43

Note: This table excludes pronouncements that only deferred or rescinded the effective dates
of previously issued statements, pertain to non-public entities, non-mandatory pronouncements
(e.g., SFAS No. 159), and those that mainly clarified definitions or frameworks. ASU 200901, 2009-16, 2009-17 also excluded because they pertain to codification.
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Table 6 - Adoption Transition Effects
Dollar Amounts in Millions

Year
1990

SFAS
Net Income
SFAS No. 106
n
206
cum
-$ 91,642 M
mean
-$ 445 M
% of NI
-196.37%

1992

SFAS No. 109
n
183
cum
$ 8,222 M
mean
$ 45 M
% of NI
-23.43%

1992

SFAS No. 112
n
86
cum
-$ 5,212 M
mean
-$ 61 M
% of NI
-19.89%

1993

SFAS No. 115
n
cum
mean
% of NI

2004

SFAS No. 123r
n
4
cum
$1M
mean
$0M
% of NI
2.50%

Retained
Earnings

Separate
Equity
Component /
OCI
[Note 1]

Other
Equity
[Note 2]

Amortization
39
-$ 7,684 M
-$ 197 M
-103.83%

2
-$ 10 M
-$ 5 M
-3.08%

Total
245
-$ 99,327 M
-$ 405 M
-181.64%
185
$ 8,212 M
$ 44 M
-23.21%
86
-$ 5,212 M
-$ 61 M
-19.89%

42
$ 6,057 M
$ 144 M
34.34%
17
-$ 12,638 M
-$ 743 M
-30.42%

42
$ 6,057 M
$ 144 M
34.34%
15
$ 15,317 M
$ 1,021 M
48.00%

36
$ 2,680 M
$ 74 M
5.90%
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Table 6 - Adoption Transition Effects
Dollar Amounts in Millions

Retained
Earnings

Separate
Equity
Component /
OCI
[Note 1]

Other
Equity
[Note
2]

Year
1998

SFAS
Net Income
SFAS No. 133
n
78
cum
-$ 897 M
mean
-$ 11 M
% of NI
-0.44%

2001

SFAS No. 142
n
81
cum
-$ 106,597 M
mean
-$ 1,316 M
% of NI
-252.94%

81
-$ 106,597 M
-$ 1,316 M
-252.94%

2001

SFAS No. 143
n
66
cum
$ 3,736 M
mean
$ 57 M
% of NI
3.06%

66
$ 3,736 M
$ 57 M
3.06%

2006

SFAS No. 158
n
cum
mean
% of NI

2009

No. 166 and 167
n
cum
mean
% of NI

113
-$ 1,982 M
-$ 18 M
-1.99%

23
$ 444 M
$ 19 M
30.02%

Total
191
-$ 2,879 M
-$ 15 M
-1.36%

329
-$ 120,688 M
-$ 367 M
-161.61%
40
-$ 33,593 M
-$ 840 M
-39.84%

Amortization

329
-$ 120,688 M
-$ 367 M
-161.61%
6
$ 18 M
$3M
-1.75%

69
-$ 33,131 M
-$ 480 M
-13.24%
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Table 6 - Adoption Transition Effects
Dollar Amounts in Millions

Year
2006

SFAS
FIN 48
n
cum
mean
% of NI

Net Income

FSP
2006 13-2
n
cum
mean
% of NI

Total

N
cum
mean
% of NI

704
-$ 192,389 M
-$ 273 M
-94.82%

Retained
Earnings

Separate
Equity
Component
/ OCI
[Note 1]

Other
Equity
[Note 2]

Amortization

Total

306
-$ 1,484 M
-$ 5 M
-3.13%

306
-$ 1,484 M
-$ 5 M
-3.13%

22
-$ 4,947 M
-$ 225 M
-6.99%

22
-$ 4,947 M
-$ 225 M
-6.99%

387
507
-$ 52,672 M -$ 116,168 M
-$ 136 M
-$ 229 M
-8.34%
-101.11%

21
$ 15,335 M
$ 730 M
33.81%

39
1,658
-$ 7,684 M -$ 353,578 M
-$ 197 M
-$ 213 M
-103.83%
-75.27%

Note 1 - SFAS No. 115 required firms to recognize certain transition effects as a separate component of equity
and preceded SFAS No. 130, which established the requirements for reporting Comprehensive Income.
However, given the similarities, I combine these adjustments in one column.
Note 2 - Other Equity includes adjustments to APIC, and Non-Controlling Interests.
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Table 7 - Categorization of Transition Effects

No.
Standard No.
Firms
FIN 48
306
FSP 13-2
22
SFAS 106
245
SFAS 109
185
SFAS 112
86
SFAS 115
42
SFAS 123r
21
SFAS 133
133
SFAS 142
81
SFAS 143
66
SFAS 158
329
166 & 167
37
Total Changes 1,553
%

Total
Number
of
Effects
on I/S
& B/S
306
22
245
185
86
42
20
191
81
66
329
37
1,610

Effect of Accounting Change
Income Statement (I/S)
Balance Sheet (B/S)
No. of
No. of
No. of
No. of
Positive Negative
Positive Negative
Effects
on
Income

Effects Total Number
on
of Effects on
Income
I/S

141
4

245
42
82

245
183
86

2
27
6
26

2
51
75
40

4
78
81
66

206
28%

537
72%

743
100%

Effects Effects
on
on
Equity Equity
96
210
22
2
38
15
45

4
1
68

34
13
241
28%

295
24
626
72%

Total
Number
of Effects
on B/S
306
22
0
2
0
42
16
113
0
0
329
37
867
100%

Note: The number of effects exceeds the number of firms because some standards had an impact on
multiple accounts. For example, SFAS No. 133 affected both the income statement and the balance sheet.
In cases where multiple balance sheet equity accounts were simultaneously affected (e.g., SFAS No.
123r), this table reflects the net directional impact of those adjustments. In one case, the net effect of the
equity adjustments was $0, and therefore this firm is not reflected in the table.
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Table 8 - Income Effect of Adopting Mandated Accounting Changes - Negative Effects

Standard
FIN 48
FSP 13-2
106
109
112
115
123r
133
142
143
158
166 & 167
Total
Changes

Total # Total
% of
of
neg
neg
effects effects effects
on
on
on
income income income

$ income effect
Z-stat

Mean
Median
(millions) (millions)

% income effecta
Mean

Median

245
183
86

245
42
82

100%
23%
95%

15.63 ***
(7.32) ***
8.41 ***

-$405
-118
-68

-$96
-23
-15

-182%
-219%
-34%

-39%
-13%
-5%

4
78
81
66

2
51
75
40

50%
65%
93%
61%

2.72 **
7.67 ***
1.72

-7
-29
-1,424
-23

-7
-5
-150
-9

-1%
-6%
-273%
-5%

-1%
-1%
-36%
-3%

743

537

72%

12.14 ***

-$408

-$39

-144%

-17%

Note: Z-Stat is computed based on the probability that increasing and decreasing effects are equally
likely (i.e., 50% benchmark).
- Income effect is computed by dividing the transition impact by the absolute value of net income
before extraordinary items (values obtained from Compustat).
a

***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .001, .01 and .05 levels, respectively.
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Table 9 - Equity Effect of Adopting Mandated Accounting Changes - Negative Effects

Standard
FIN 48
FSP 13-2
106
109
112
115
123r
133
142
143
158
166 & 167
Total
Changes

Total
Total
% of
# of
neg
negative
effects effects effects
on
on
on
Equity Equity Equity

$ Equity Effect
Z-stat

306
22

210
22

69%
100%

6.52 ***
4.69 ***

2

2

100%

1.41

42
16
113

4
1
68

10%
6%
60%

329
37

295
24

867

626

% Equity Effecta

Mean
Median
(millions) (millions)

Mean

Median

-$35
-225

-$12
-75

-1%
-1%

0%
-1%

-5

-5

0%

0%

(5.25) ***
(3.50) ***
2.16 *

-11
-839
-52

-3
-839
-13

0%
-2%
-1%

0%
-2%
0%

90%
65%

14.39 ***
1.81

-419
-1,579

-118
-125

-26%
-2%

-2%
-1%

72%

13.08 ***

-$285

-$37

-13%

-1%

Note: Z-Stat is computed based on the probability that increasing and decreasing effects are equally
likely (i.e., 50% benchmark).
- Equity effect is computed by dividing the amount of the adjustment by the absolute value of
shareholders equity's excluding the transition impact (value obtained from Compustat).
a

***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .001, .01 and .05 levels, respectively.
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Table 10 - Implementation Methods by Year

Year
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Total

Cum or
Separate
Prospective
Equity
Adj. to Net Component/ Retained
Income
OCI
Earnings
2
18
210
225
19
52
21
6
2
1
1
78
108
72
3
76
2
1
6
1
260
12
69
232
92
3
22
38
1
2
743
507
385

Other
Equity

Total

1
1

6
9

6
23

2
18
210
245
74
8
1
1
186
75
76
2
13
282
301
92
3
66
3
1,658
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Table 11 - Categorization of Transition Effects Pre/Post 2006
PRE 2006 STANDARDS

Standard
SFAS 106
SFAS 109
SFAS 112
SFAS 115
SFAS 123r
SFAS 133
SFAS 142
SFAS 143

Effect of Accounting Change
Income Statement
Balance Sheet
Negative Adjustments
Positive Adjustments
Negative Adjustments
Positive Adjustments

Total
Number
of Firm
Effects
Median
I/S &
Mean (in
(in
B/S
N
millions) millions)
245 245
-$405 M
-$96 M
185 42
-$118 M
-$23 M
86 82
-$68 M
-$15 M
42
20
2
-$7 M
-$7 M
191 51
-$29 M
-$5 M
81 75 -$1,424 M -$150 M
66 40
-$23 M
-$9 M
916 537
-$408 M
-$39 M
N
I/ S
Summary Mean
Median
Totals

Mean
Median
(in
(in
millions) millions)

N
141
4

$93 M
$94 M

$18 M
$74 M

2
27
6
26
206

$7 M
$22 M
$35 M
$179 M
$92 M

$7 M
$6 M
$7 M
$41 M
$16 M

743
-$269 M
-$14 M

Mean (in
millions)

Median
(in
millions)

2

-$5 M

-$5 M

4
1
68

-$11 M
-$839 M
-$52 M

-$3 M
-$839 M
-$13 M

38
15
45

$161 M
$235 M
$34 M

$53 M
$84 M
$15 M

75

$114 M

$31 M

98

-$59 M

-$11 M

N

N
B/S
Summary Mean
Median
Totals

N

Mean
Median
(in
(in
millions) millions)

173
$39 M
$3 M
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Table 11 - Categorization of Transition Effects Pre/Post 2006
POST 2005 STANDARDS

Standard
FIN 48
FSP 13-2
SFAS 158
166 & 167

Total
Number
of Firm
Effects
I/S &
B/S
306
22
329
37
694

Effect of Accounting Change

Income Statement

N

0

Mean (in
millions)

0

Median
(in
millions)

0

N

0

Balance Sheet
Negative Adjustments
Positive Adjustments

Mean
Median
(in
(in
millions) millions)

0

0

N
210
22
295
24
551

Median
Mean (in
(in
millions) millions)
-$35 M
-$12 M
-$225 M
-$75 M
-$419 M -$118 M
-$1,579 M -$125 M
-$316 M
-$50 M
Total
B/S
Summary Mean
Median
Totals

Mean
Median
(in
(in
N millions) millions)
96
$62 M
$9 M
34
13
143

$87 M
$367 M
$96 M

$16 M
$45 M
$11 M

694
-$231 M
-$23 M
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Table 12 - Transition Adoption Rationale
Year

1990

1992

1992

1993

SFAS

SFAS
106

SFAS
109

SFAS
112

SFAS
115

Cumulative Effect to
NI
Consistent with APB
20 - Change in
Accounting Principle
(the income statement
should report the
cumulative effect of
most accounting
changes in the period
of adoption)
Consistent with APB
20 - Change in
Accounting Principle
(the income statement
should report the
cumulative effect of
most accounting
changes in the period
of adoption)

Cumulative Effect to
Equity/RE/OCI
Not Consistent with APB
20 (Adjustments to
beginning retained
earnings are only
appropriate when
correcting prior period
errors or implementing
certain specified changes
in accounting principles.)
Not Consistent with APB
20 (Adjustments to
beginning retained
earnings are only
appropriate when
correcting prior period
errors or implementing
certain specified changes
in accounting principles.)

Consistent with APB
20 - Change in
Accounting Principle
(the income statement
should report the
cumulative effect of
most accounting
changes in the period
of adoption)

No explanatory
comments

Restatement

Prospective

Impractical
(Preferable method
but not possible to
retroactively derive
an estimate)

Magnitude (availed
this method due to the
large adjustments
required by the
standard but FASB
recognizes negative
impact on
comparability)

Comparability
(preferable method
but made optional
because of hardship
concerns)

No explanatory
comments

Not Consistent with APB
20 (Adjustments to
beginning retained
earnings are only
appropriate when
correcting prior period
errors or implementing
certain specified changes
in accounting principles.)

No explanatory
comments

Volatility - Routing
available for sale
securities fair values
through equity minimizes
income fluctuations.

Impractical (not
possible to
retroactively
categorize current
intent)

Magnitude (FASB
concluded that unlike
SFAS No. 106, a
provision for delayed
recognition is not
needed to mitigate the
financial statement
impact, and it would
have added
unnecessary
complexity and
reduced financial
statement
comparability)
No explanatory
comments
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Table 12 - Transition Adoption Rationale
Year

SFAS

1998

SFAS
133

2001

SFAS
142

2001

2004

SFAS
143

SFAS
123r

Cumulative Effect to
NI
Consistent with APB
20 - Change in
Accounting Principle
(the income statement
should report the
cumulative effect of
most accounting
changes in the period
of adoption)
Consistent with APB
20 - Change in
Accounting Principle
(the income statement
should report the
cumulative effect of
most accounting
changes in the period
of adoption). More
representationally
faithful than reporting
loss as part of income
from operations.
Consistent with APB
20 - Change in
Accounting Principle
(the income statement
should report the
cumulative effect of
most accounting
changes in the period
of adoption)
No explanatory
comments

Cumulative Effect to
Equity/RE/OCI

Consistent with APB 20 Change in Accounting
Principle (similar to the
income statement -should report the
cumulative effect of most
accounting changes in the
period of adoption)

Restatement

Prospective

Impractical (not
possible to
retroactively
categorize current
intent)

No explanatory
comments

No explanatory comments

No explanatory
comments

No explanatory
comments

No explanatory comments

Preferred method
but Hardship (rate
regulated entities
expressed concern)

Informativeness
(existing ARO would
not be affected)

No explanatory comments

Impractical (not
possible to make
estimates for a prior
period) so a flexible
modified
retrospective
approach was
permitted.

Undesirable because
pre-existing awards
would have been
excluded, so
modified prospective
approach was
required.
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Table 12 - Transition Adoption Rationale
Year

SFAS

Cumulative Effect to
NI

2006

SFAS
158

No explanatory
comments

Cumulative Effect to
Equity/RE/OCI
Deemed 2nd best option
under provisions of
SFAS 154 since
retrospective was
perceived as hardship

2006

FSP
13-2

No explanatory
comments

No explanatory
comments

2006

FIN
48

No explanatory
comments

Deemed change in
accounting principle

2009

SFAS
166
167

No explanatory
comments

No explanatory
comments

Restatement
Hardship (even
though retrospective
generally required
under SFAS No.
154)

Prospective
No explanatory
comments

Impractical
(Preferable method
but not possible to
retroactively derive
an estimate)

Consistency (some
firms had already
settled with IRS)

No explanatory
comments

No explanatory
comments

Integrity /
Consistency

Integrity /
Consistency

Note: White boxes indicate an acceptable transition method. Grey boxes indicate that the method was not permitted.
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Table 13 - Ranking of Adoption Effects

N/A

329

(120,688)

1

(367)

4

-162%

3

N/A

1990

Scaled
Effect

Rank

2006

SFAS
No. 158

Rank

2006

Rank

Firms

Cumulative
Effect (in
millions)

Implementation Implementation
Year Standard
Option1
Option2
Cumulative
effect of change
on Other
Comprehensive
Income

Mean
Effect
(in
millions)

FIN 48

Cumulative
effect of change
on Retained
Earnings

306

(1,484)

8

(5)

12

-3%

8

SFAS
No. 106

Report the
transition
obligation on the
statement of
financial
position, and
Cumulative
recognize it on
Effect of Change
245
the statement of
on Net Income
income by
amortizing it
over plan
participants'
future service
periods.

(99,327)

3

(405)

3

-182%

2
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Table 13 - Ranking of Adoption Effects

SFAS No.
109

1992

SFAS No.
112

2001

SFAS No.
142

Cumulative
Effect of Change
on Net Income
Cumulative
Effect of Change
on Net Income
Cumulative
Effect of Change
on Net Income

Scaled
Effect

Rank

1992

Rank

1998

Cumulative
Effect of Change
on Net Income
AND also as a
cumulative effect
of change on
SFAS No.
Other
133
Comprehensive
Income
(treatment
depends on the
nature of the
derivative
instrument).

Implementation
Option2

N/A

191

(2,879)

7

(15)

11

-1%

9

Retroactive
Restatement

185

8,212

12

44

10

-23%

4

N/A

86

(5,212)

5

(61)

8

-20%

5

N/A

81

(106,597)

2

(1,316)

1

-253%

1

Rank

Standard

Mean
Effect
(in
millions)

Firms

Implementation
Option1

Year

Cumulati
ve Effect
(in
millions)
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Table 13 - Ranking of Adoption Effects

(480)

3,736

10

42

6,057

Modified
Prospective

36

N/A

22

2009

No. 166
and 167

Cumulative
effect of change
on Retained
Earnings

Retrospective
application with
cumulative
adjustment to
retained earnings
of the earliest
period presented

69

(33,131)

2001

SFAS No.
143

Cumulative
Effect of Change
on Net Income

N/A

66

N/A

Standard

1993

SFAS No.
115

2004

SFAS No.
123r

2006

FSP 13-2

Retained
Earnings and
also Cumulative
effect of change
to Equity
(treatment
depends on the
nature)
Modified
Retrospective

Cumulative
effect of change
on Retained
Earnings

Scaled
Effect

Rank

4

Implementation
Option2

Year

Rank

Mean
Effect (in
millions)

Implementation
Option1

Firms

Rank

Cumulati
ve Effect
(in
millions)

2

-13%

6

57

9

3%

10

11

144

6

34%

12

2,680

9

74

7

6%

11

(4,947)

6

(225)

5

-7%

7
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Essay 2: Does the Financial Statement Location of Transition Adjustments Matter to
Investors?
1. Introduction
Firms are differentially affected by accounting rules, and therefore some firms will be
adversely affected when new standards are promulgated. Consequently, new accounting
standards issued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) invariably engender
resistance. This adversity is costly to the FASB because it undermines its authority and, as a
consequence, introduces political costs to the organization. One potential mechanism for the
FASB to mitigate opposition to new standards is to reduce adoption costs by writing standards
that afford firms with implementation flexibility.
In this paper I examine whether the location of reported transition adjustments matters to
investors. While prior literature has examined the value relevance of financial information
presented in alternative financial statement locations, these studies have generally focused on
individual standards in isolation (e.g., Bartov and Mohanram 2014, Davis-Friday et al. 1999,
etc.). By hand collecting the transition adjustments recorded by S&P 500 firms in conjunction
with the adoption of 13 accounting pronouncements, I am able to examine this issue using a
significantly more comprehensive sample than utilized in extant literature. The pronouncements I
examine were issued between 1993 and 2014 and are not limited exclusively to Statements of
Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS’s). My sample includes all significant accounting
promulgations issued during this period, including guidance issued by the SEC (e.g., SAB 101
and SAB 108), and also non-mandatory pronouncements (e.g., SFAS No. 159).
Whether investors price transition adjustments differently depending on their financial
statement location is an empirical question. The answer to this question is relevant because of its
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potential contribution to pre-existing capital markets research. Additionally, accounting standard
setters might be particularly interested in better understanding the relationship between the
location of prescribed transition adjustments and its effect on firm value. If accounting standard
setters seek to mitigate their political costs when issuing new standards (e.g., Balsam et al.
1995b), then it is important to ascertain whether the location of some transition adjustment
locations are relatively less costly to firms. This knowledge would allow standard setters to
selectively prescribe transition adjustment locations that impose a smaller burden on firms, and,
by doing so, they could potentially mitigate their own political costs. However, if the stock
market impounds the magnitude of transition adjustments into its calculus of firm value without
regard to location, then the ability of standard setters to effectively utilize location as a tool to
reduce their political costs is diminished. Therefore, the inferences drawn from this study might
help influence which transition policies are stipulated in future accounting standards.
2. Motivation
2.1 Inferences from Essay 1 as a Motivator for Essay 2.
In Essay 1, “Changes in the Implementation Flexibility and Financial Statement Location
of Mandated Accounting Standards”, I studied whether recent accounting standards issued by the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) avail firms with implementation flexibility.
Implementation flexibility can manifest itself either via managerial discretion over adoption
timing, or by the financial statement location in which transition adjustments are to be
recognized.
My sample was composed of 13 significant mandated accounting standards issued
between 1988 and 2014. Similar to the findings of Balsam et al. (1995b) who previously
examined this same question utilizing a sample of accounting standards issued between 1973 and
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1988, I document that the FASB affords implementation timing flexibility to firms. For example,
the average implementation window for the 11 significant mandated standards (SFAS’s) in my
sample was nearly one year longer than it was for the remaining standards issued by the FASB
during the same period.47
With regard to the financial statement location of required transition adjustments, my
findings indicate that there has been a shift relative to the findings previously documented by
Balsam et al. (1995b). They found evidence of a dichotomous pattern in which firms were
systematically able to recognize equity increasing transition adjustments on the income statement
while equity decreasing adjustments were relegated to the balance sheet. For example, between
1973 and 1988 over 87% of the transition adjustments recognized by Fortune 500 companies
were income increasing, while 89% of the balance sheet adjustments were negative. In contrast,
using my more recent sample of accounting standards I do not find any difference between the
frequencies of equity decreasing adjustments on the income statement and balance sheet.
Additionally, I find a rate for income increasing adjustments on the income statement of just
28% compared to the former rate of 87.1%. Collectively, the differences suggest a change in the
locale of transition adjustments associated with mandated accounting standards.
Regarding location, a distinguishing attribute of the income statement transition
adjustments associated with significant mandated accounting standards issued between 1973 and
1988 is that they were all recognized as part of firms’ ordinary income (“above the line”). A
different pattern emerged in the years that followed. Between the years 1990 and 2001 the
income statement transition adjustments associated with significant mandated accounting
My sample was composed of 13 significant mandated accounting standards, of which 11 were
Statements of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS’s) and 2 were SEC issued SAB’s.
47
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standards were reported in accordance with APB No. 20. Consequently, they were located on the
income statement as separately stated “cumulative effect” type changes “below the line”. During
this same period, other accounting standards have also called for transition adjustments to be
recognized as a separate component of equity (e.g., SFAS No. 115), through Other
Comprehensive Income (e.g., SFAS No. 158), and as adjustments to retained earnings or other
equity accounts (e.g., SFAS No. 166 and 167). 48 Thus, accounting standards have historically
permitted firms to utilize a multitude of reporting locations when recognizing transition
adjustments. Whether the stock market differentiates between these alternative reporting
locations has not previously been examined.
2.2 Theories Predicting Investor Responses to Accounting Information
There are at least two theories that offer insight into potential investor responses to
accounting information. The efficient markets hypothesis suggests that investors will efficiently
process all financial information and, as such, stock prices will value equivalent information
without regard to financial statement location. At first glance, this suggests that investors will
perceive differences in the location of transition adjustments as cosmetic only. However, prior
research finds an association between the location of financial information and its value
relevance to investors (e.g., Ohlson and Penman 1992). One reason for this is that investors
perceive differences in the persistence of earnings and cash flows across alternative financial
statement locations (e.g., Fairfield et al. 1996, Burgstahler et al. 2002, etc.). Additionally,
Positive Accounting Theory (PAT) suggests that, because of contractual implications, the
location of financial information can have real effects on firms’ future cash flows and earnings.

Other Comprehensive Income was established by SFAS No. 130 in 1997 (and therefore not
relevant in Balsam et al.’s 1995b study)
48
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At least two theories offer a prediction regarding investor behavior to alternative
transition adjustment locations.49 The efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) suggests that informed
investors will essentially “see-through” cosmetic effects, and, as such, firm value will not be
differentially affected by the location of transition adjustments unless there is a location specific
effect on firms’ future cash flows.50,51 For example, an article in the Wall Street Journal,
rejecting corporations’ opposition to stock option expensing on the grounds that doing so would
cause large share price declines, summarized their disbelief as follows: “That journalists can
recognize when shares are overvalued because of an accounting trick and all the world's
billionaire fund managers can't is rather thick. In fact, information is not ‘hidden’ just because it's
not in the income statement, and professors of finance have long understood that investors are
not fooled by changes in accounting procedures.” 52 The presumption is that investors are not
naïve, and therefore the stock market does not respond mechanistically to accounting shuffles.
In contrast, positive accounting theory (Watts and Zimmerman 1986) suggests that even
seemingly cosmetic changes can have real effects on firm value because of the widespread

I acknowledge the historical significance of alternative hypotheses. The mechanistic
hypothesis predicts a direct and automatic stock price response to earnings changes, regardless of
the cash flow implications. The functional fixation hypothesis maintains that investors are
unsophisticated and therefore unable to decipher accounting information. Consequently, their
predictions regarding firms’ future cash flows are biased and investors can be deceived by firms’
choices and methods (Hand 1990). I do not discuss these hypotheses because both lack
widespread support.
50
Cosmetic changes refer to accounting choices that have no effect on cash flow or transaction
costs.
51
For example, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which builds on the assumptions of
the EMH, implies that firm value can be computed by discounting the stream of future cash
flows. Since accounting changes that are nominal only have no effect on future cash flows or the
discount rate, no value is assigned to these changes.
52
Optional Logic. The Wall Street Journal. September 21, 1998, page A28
49
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contractual implications.
2.2.1 The Efficient Markets Hypothesis
The efficient markets hypothesis was developed independently by Paul A. Samuelson and
Eugene F. Fama in the 1960’s. In its semi-strong form, the theory assumes that investors
impound all publically available information into the formulation of stock prices. Consequently,
if efficient markets exist, then the location of transition adjustments should have no impact on
stock prices unless the location directly affects cash, influences incentives, or has signaling
effects (i.e., Kothari 2001 and Beaver 1973).
The assumption of efficient markets maintains a presence in the canon of theoretical
literature but its practical role is arguably limited. In recent years, many have pointed to recent
stock market bubbles as evidence that markets are not completely efficient, and have maintained
that there is a behavioral component to stock pricing that reflects human psychology (e.g.,
prospect theory). Alan Greenspan, former Federal Reserve Chairman, expressed his concern that
“irrational exuberance” drove up stock prices in the dot-com bubble of the 1990’s, and Nobel
Laureate Robert Shiller (2000) has made the case that capital markets tend to both overreact to
news and react to non-news.
Empirical studies have also denigrated the case for market efficiency. In particular,
studies have documented anomalous stock return behavior, which undermines the case for stock
market efficiency. These anomalies reflect predictable price patterns that are difficult to
rationalize in the context of an efficient market. Over and under price reactions (DeBondt and
Thaler 1985), post earnings announcement drift (Bernard and Thomas 1989), as well as curious
associations with variables such as time (e.g., Harris 1986), calendric seasonalities (Keim 1983,
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Roll 1983, and Rozeff and Kinney 1976), and dividend and earnings yields are all examples of
these seemingly inconsistent behaviors (Ball 1989). Shiller’s (1981) work on fundamental stock
valuation and other studies that document excess returns based on firm size (Banz 1981) and
value (Basu 1977 and Ball 1978), suggest that there are systemic challenges to the presumption
of efficient markets.
Despite what appears to be diminished support for the EMH (e.g., see Kothari 2001 for a
survey of such literature) markets are not perceived to be inefficient either. However, it is
unclear whether the markets are sufficiently efficient to discriminate between the effects caused
by various accounting changes. Ball (1972), for example, finds that the stock markets can
distinguish between real and accounting only effects on reported income, and do not respond to
earnings changes that have been induced by accounting techniques. Studies looking at the impact
of changes in depreciation methods corroborate Ball’s finding (e.g., Archibald 1972, Comiskey
1971, etc.). In contrast to these findings, which suggest that the market can undo certain
accounting treatments to discern the real financial impact, Ahmed et al. (2006) find a market
reaction only to the disclosure of derivatives when they appeared on the balance sheet of U.S.
Banks, but not when the same information had previously been available as a supplemental
disclosure. This finding is inconsistent with market efficiency and demonstrates that financial
statement location can sometimes affect firm value. Although numerous studies have been
conducted on the efficient nature of markets, my intention is not to provide an exhaustive review,
but instead to emphasize that the EMH does not provide a comprehensive prediction for the
stock market’s reaction to the location of accounting information.
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2.2.2 Positive Accounting Theory
An alternative means of understanding investor behavior derives from positive
accounting theory (PAT). PAT does not conflict with the EMH, but instead reconciles how
economic consequences can result from accounting choices regardless of whether markets are
efficient or not.
PAT views the firm as a nexus of contracts. As contracts are created, enforced and
monitored, they depend on accounting numbers and, therefore, derive value from these numbers
(Sunder 1997). Consequently, even if accounting changes are primarily cosmetic in nature, these
changes can affect firm value because of their impact on both contractual obligations and
associated cash flows. For example, because debt contracts are usually based on current
accounting measures such as net income and other financial metrics (Fields et al. 2001), the
location in which financial statement information is presented can adversely affect debt covenant
slack and ultimately hasten covenant violations.
Adverse consequences to covenant violations include a negative stock market reaction
(Beneish and Press 1995), and the imposition of constraints on a firm’s ability to pay dividends,
repurchase shares, invest in other firms, or dispose of assets (Watts and Zimmerman 1986).
Because debt covenant violations are costly, firms go to great lengths to avoid violating them
(e.g., DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994, Dichev and Skinner 2002). However, since covenants are
based on underlying financial ratios, the recognition of financial information in locations that
adversely affect these ratios can be costly to firms.
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Other contractual outcomes are also likely to be differentially affected depending on
where financial information is recognized in the financial statements. For example, this is true of
bonus compensation when it is tied to particular financial or earnings benchmarks.
Neither EFM nor PAT provides unequivocal predictions regarding investor reactions to
alternative transition adjustment locations. EFM and PAT both afford recognition of the fact that
information will be valued according to its perceived effects on firms’ future cash flows and
earnings. However, it is not obvious whether the location, or reporting method, of transition
adjustments affects either cash flows or earnings.
Prior research indicates that location based differences in valuation do occur.
Specifically, the value relevance of financial information differs across alternative reporting
locations. For example, Chambers et al. (2007) find that investors assign greater value to OCI
components when they are disclosed in the statement of changes in equity relative to other
alternative permitted locations (e.g., SFAS No. 130 also permits disclosure in the income
statement or as a separate stand-alone financial statement). Similarly, Fairfield et al. (1996)
examine the predictive value of disaggregated earnings (including, but not limited to
extraordinary items and discontinued operations) and find that individual components of income
enhance the accuracy of future profitability forecasts. However, they document that
extraordinary items are uninformative insofar as the ability to predict future earnings.
Collectively, prior literature suggests that investor responses are influenced by the location of
financial information. But, it is unclear whether these inferences can be extended to the reporting
of transition adjustments that arise from the adoption of new accounting standards.
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Transition adjustments generally occur years after a pronouncement is conceived, and the
nature of the adjustments are particularly well publicized. Moreover, disclosures of transition
adjustments are arguably more transparent and uniformly applied than other non-recurring firm
adjustments. For example, amounts recognized as discontinued operations, or extraordinary
items, are often firm specific and therefore their information content is arguably more opaque
than it is for disclosures that result from a standard whose applicability is pervasive.
3. Prior Literature
3.1 The Role of Financial Statement Disclosure Location on Firm Value
Extant literature has investigated the role of financial statement disclosure locations on
firm value. These studies have often focused on individual standards (e.g., Davis-Friday et al.
1999, Davis-Friday et al. 2004). Bartov and Mohanram (2014) utilized the regime change
surrounding SFAS No. 145 to identify whether the location of gains/losses arising from early
extinguishment matters to investors.53 They found that the location of these gain/losses had
detectable valuation effects. Specifically, a detectable stock market reaction was observed only
when the information was presented “above-the-line”, but no stock market response occurred
when the gains/losses were reported as extraordinary items.
Bartov and Mohanram (2014) note that there are two strands of research that examine the
relevance of individual line items on the income statement. The first strand pertains to the value
relevance of alternative income statement disclosures on stock returns. The other strand

SFAS No. 145 (issued in 2002) provided a temporal shift in accounting since it changed the
reporting location of gains and losses. Prior to SFAS No. 145, gains/losses from early
extinguishment of debt were recognized as extraordinary items. Subsequent to SFAS No. 145,
these gains/losses were generally recognized as part of ordinary income.
53

92

examines the persistence of various income statement components insofar as they enable
investors to predict firms’ future earnings.
3.1.1 Research on the Value Relevance of Alternative Income Statement Disclosures
Regarding the first strand, Lipe (1986) finds that disaggregated components of income
provide incremental information in explaining stock returns. Specifically, Gross Profits and
General and Administrative expense provide the greatest contribution. Ohlson and Penman
(1992) also examine the value of disaggregated earnings data and provide evidence that
individual components enhance the explanatory power of stock returns. However, there are
differences between components insofar as the magnitude of their impact on stock returns.
In terms of more broad measures of income, investors respond more to street earnings
than to GAAP earnings, and firms’ “street earnings” are unlikely to include special item
components that GAAP earnings include (Bradshaw and Sloan 2002). This is consistent with
findings that 1) there is a decrease in the value relevance of GAAP earnings (e.g., Francis and
Schipper, 1999); and 2) investors do not fully impound the implications of special items into
stock prices (Burgstahler et al. 2002).
Mcvay (2006) presents evidence consistent with managerial preferences for certain
reporting locations. She finds a shift of expenses from core locations to special items. Even
though this behavior has no effect on net income, it facilitates the ability of firms to meet
analysts’ benchmarks because forecasts tend to exclude special items. Consequently, the finding
implicitly recognizes the potential for financial statement location to affect share value.
3.1.2 Research on the Predictive Value of Disaggregated Earnings
Regarding the second strand of relevant research, Fairfield et al. (1996) examine the
predictive value of disaggregated earnings (including, but not limited to extraordinary items and
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discontinued operations) and find that individual components of income enhance the accuracy of
future profitability forecasts. They further document that extraordinary items are uninformative
insofar as predicting future earnings.
Balsam et al. (1995a) studied differential market responses to alternative implementation
methods of mandated accounting changes and found that that investors respond to adoption
effects when they are reported as part of ordinary income, but there is no investor response when
the adjustments are reported elsewhere.
4. Sample Selection
My study requires that I compose a sample of transition adjustments and examine how
the stock market responds to them. I limit the scope of my study to include only those transition
adjustments that are associated with significant accounting standards. Identifying significant
standards is a subjective process but standards are deemed significant if they have pervasive
effects on S&P 500 firms’ financial statements, or because the magnitude of the required
transition adjustments are large.
To form my sample, I build upon on a pre-existing sample of transition adjustments that
were previously studied in “Changes in the Implementation Flexibility and Financial Statement
Location of Mandated Accounting Standards.” In that paper I constructed a sample of 13
significant mandated accounting standards from the population of 158 standards that were issued
by the FASB between the years 1987 and 2014, and then hand collected the transition adjustment
amounts and locations relating to those standards. Transition amounts and locations were
primarily obtained from 10-K filings resulting from queries on Edgar Pro, or the Edgar I-Metrix
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databases. Because my data is hand collected, I further restrict my sample to include only
transition adjustments that were recognized on the 10-K filings of S&P 500 constituent firms. 54
In this study I examine the transition effects associated with 10 significant accounting
standards (SFAS’s) identified in the previously referenced study. 55 I also include several
additional accounting promulgations that were omitted (from the referenced study) because they
failed to meet all the inclusion criteria. For example, SAB No. 101 and SAB No. 108 would have
been included if not for the fact that they were issued by the SEC, instead of by the FASB.
Similarly, because SFAS No. 159 was not mandatory it was excluded. In consideration of their
economic significance, I include the transition adjustments arising from these 3 standards to this
study. In total, the transition effects of 13 accounting standards on S&P 500 index constituent
firms are considered (Table 1).
The adoption effects of the 13 selected accounting standards are hand collected from the
financial statements of firms that compose the S&P 500 index in the year 2000. I eliminate firms
that adopted less than one significant standard or were plagued by survivorship issues due to
bankruptcies, mergers, etc. (n=60), as well as those firms that are not found on the Eventus (n=7)
or I/B/E/S (n=19) databases. Firms that recognize multiple location effects in the same year are
generally retained in the sample. However, I drop firms that do not possess at least one reporting
period in which their transition adjustments are confined exclusively to one reporting location
(n=13). Table 2 illustrates the attrition process and reveals how I arrive at my final sample size of
401 firms.
Only those firms that comprised the S&P 500 index in the year 2000 are considered because
that year represents the midpoint for the years spanned by those standards whose transition
adjustments are examined.
55
Due to data limitations, I am unable to hand collect transition data for 3 standards (SFAS 106,
109 and 112).
54
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5. Methodology
To ascertain whether the location of transition adjustments affects stock market behavior,
I utilize an event study methodology. While my methodology is motivated by Balsam et al.
(1995a), the construct of my study is significantly different. For example, I observe short
window stock market responses around SEC filings (8-K, 10-Q, 10-K, etc.) in which the
transition adoption effects are first quantified. In contrast, their research design calls for an
association test that utilizes a one-year time horizon around 10-K filing dates. 56 Although an
advantage of using a long time horizon is that it does not necessitate the identification of a
precise event date (Balsam et al. 1995a) begin their observation period in the “fourth month of
the fiscal year of adoption”), the long window required for association tests also means that
confounding events are likely to occur during the observation period. This presents a significant
drawback because it is often difficult to assert causal relationships when using an association
test. Additionally, because of the high volume of information that is made available to investors
during the examination period, these tests are frequently plagued by high noise-to-signal ratios
(Balsam et al. 1995a).
Consequently, event studies have several advantages over long window association tests.
Most importantly, they afford a more powerful test of causality when markets rapidly process
information. An event study is also an appropriate mechanism to identify whether perceptions of

In contrast to Balsam et al. (1995a), I utilize a standard OLS regression whereas they apply a
regression on ranks approach. I introduce binary variables to represent the various financial
statement locations and also include a separate variable to control for the magnitude of the
adjustments, while they do not make such a distinction. Additionally, my study considers the
potential effects of OCI adjustments, which did not exist at the time Balsam et al. (1995a) was
published since comprehensive income disclosures were mandated by SFAS No. 130 for fiscal
year beginning after December 15, 1997.
56
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future cash flows differ between alternative reporting locations:
If the level or variability of prices changes around the event date, then the
conclusion is that the accounting event conveys new information about the amount,
timing, and/or uncertainty of future cash flows that revised the market’s previous
expectations (Kothari, 2001).
There are precedents in prior literature that demonstrate the applicability of event studies to
address my research question. For example, Bartov and Mohanram (2014) examine the short
window returns around 10-K/10-Q filing dates to identify whether the income statement
placement of gains/losses associated with early extinguishment of debt matters to investors.
One potential problem with using an event study is that the stock market’s reaction will
be muted if the selected event date is not informationally significant. For example, if estimates
were already disclosed prior to a firm’s 10-K filing date, then the stock market is likely to have
already impounded much of the transition adjustment information into firms’ stock prices before
the filing date of this report. As such, there might not be discernable market responses to the 10K information.57 This concern is mitigated by evidence suggesting that investors respond to
information when it is formally recognized in firms’ financial statements even when prior
disclosures or related estimates have been provided (e.g., Davis-Friday et al. 1999, Davis-Friday
et al. 2004). Other studies have also found that the full incorporation of earnings news into stock
prices is not always timely. For example, stock prices underestimate the implications of quarterly
earnings on future earnings (Bernard and Thomas 1990), and delay impounding information
conveyed in special items (Burgstahler et al. 2002). Therefore, it is not improbable that stock
price reactions to transition adjustments will occur around 10-K filing dates even if prior
transition adjustment estimates were disseminated.
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However, to ensure that I capture the stock market’s most robust response to transition
adjustment disclosures, I establish my event study window to coincide with the first SEC filing
in which the transition adjustments are quantified. Consequently, the events in my study
predominately reflect 10-K (47%), 8-K (7%), and 10-Q (46%) filing dates (Table 3).
Additionally, approximately one-third of both the 10-K and 10-Q filings provide the estimated
impact of accounting standards (n=303), while the remainder provide actual amounts (n=711).
5.1 Regression Model
I use the following regression model to capture the location effects of transition adjustments
disclosed in 10-K filings:
CAR(-1,+2) = α + β1Earnings Surprise + β2Transition Adjustment + Σβ3-5Locations + ε (1)
Where:
CAR represents the cumulative abnormal returns for S&P 500 firms that disclosed
transition adjustments in 10-K filings. I used a short event window of 3 days, beginning 1 days
before the 10-K is filed with the SEC and extending 2 days beyond. Abnormal returns are
derived using the market model in conjunction with the Eventus database. Whenever possible, I
obtain the SEC disclosure filing dates from the Audit Analytics database or Thompson One.
Alternatively, I manually collect the filing dates from the SEC’s Edgar website.
I control for the effect of earnings surprise on CAR. Earnings Surprise represents the
difference between the arithmetic average of analysts’ mean earnings per share estimates at the
time earnings are released, and actual earnings per share. This information is obtained from the
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I/B/E/S unadjusted summary surprise history file.58 All earnings surprises are recorded as 0
unless I/B/E/S reports an earnings surprise that coincides with my event window.
The amount of each transition adjustment resulting from the adoption of selected
mandated accounting standards is captured in the Transition Adjustment variable. These amounts
are manually collected from firms’ SEC filings using a combination of archival data resources
(e.g., Edgar I-Metrix, Edgar Pro, SEC’s Edgar database, etc.), and then scaled by the number of
outstanding shares at year-end (from Compustat).59 Both the transition adjustment and earnings
surprise variables are scaled by firms’ closing stock price on the last day of firms’ reporting year
to control for size effects across firms, and also to make these variables dimensionally consistent
with returns (Balsam et al. 1995a).
I introduce binary variables into my regression to control for the possibility of transition
adjustment location effects. Significant coefficients on any of these variables would indicate that
there are differential stock market reactions to the location of transition adjustments, independent
of their magnitude. I also test whether the location variables, taken as a whole, are significant by
testing whether the coefficients on the location variables are simultaneously equal to zero.
When firms recognize multiple transition adjustments in the same reporting period, these
amounts are aggregated by location. However, observations are dropped when firms
simultaneously recognize transition adjustments in multiple locations during the same period.

Generally analysts forecast income from continuing operations (after extra-ordinary charges,
discontinued operations, and non-operating items have been backed out). For consistency, the
I/B/E/S surprise history file presents actual earnings in a conformity with this same
methodology. Consequently, I/B/E/S adjusted earnings may not agree with earnings as reported
on the 10-K.
59
This transformation is performed for consistency across explanatory variables in my
regression. Both transition amounts and the earnings surprises are computed on a per share basis.
58
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6. Hypothesis
If location does not matter to investors, then the coefficients on the location variables will not be
significant. Consequently, in the alternative form:
Ho: The location effect of the transition adjustment coefficients will be equal to zero.
7. Results
The total number of transition adjustments recognized by firms in my study is 1,014, and
the distribution of these adjustments suggests that they are not heavily concentrated in any one
particular financial statement location. For example, disaggregating the adjustments reveals the
following representations: 206 (20%) are cumulative effect type adjustments to net income, 355
(35%) affect retained earnings, 415 (41%) adjust Other Comprehensive Income (OCI), and 38
(4%) appear in alternative financial statement locations (Table 4 Panel A).
The observations in my sample also reflect significant temporal continuity, suggesting
that inferences are likely to be time invariant. Adjustments are recognized in nearly every year
between 1993 and 2011, with the exception of just 4 years in which no transition adjustments
were recorded. During the span of years examined the number of recognized annual transition
adjustments ranges from 0 to 305, with an annual average of 68.
As a result of FIN 48 and SFAS No. 158, more than 54% of the total adjustments were
recognized in the years 2006 and 2007. However, the locations of the effects recorded in these
two years were dissimilar. The predominant location for the 2006 adjustments was OCI, while
the 2007 adjustments largely affected retained earnings.
Table 4 (Panel A) also reveals that a temporal shift in the location of transition
adjustments occurred. Prior to 2005, approximately 61% of the transition adjustments were
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recognized as separately stated cumulative effect type adjustments to net income. In contrast,
beginning in 2005 recognition of transition adjustments occurred almost exclusively as part of
retained earnings (52%) or OCI (46%).
There are 13 accounting standards covered in my study. The number of standards adopted
by sample firms ranged from 1 to 7 (Citigroup). Approximately 57% of these firms adopted at
least 2 standards, while 43% adopted 3 or more (Table 4: Panel B). Of the total 1,014 firm years
examined, the greatest number is derived from firms that adopted 2 standards (n=124), but the
majority (69%) of the firm years are attributable to firms that adopted between 2 and 4 standards.
Every firm in my sample recognized the adoption effects of at least one accounting
standard. Table 5 summarizes the prevalence for each of the 13 standards covered in this study.
This table also cross tabulates the financial statement reporting locations recognized by firms
adopting these standards. Of the 1,014 observations, 744 arise pursuant to standards whose
transition adjustments were confined to just one location.
Table 6 presents descriptive statistics for the dependent and explanatory variables
included in my regression model. Since all the explanatory variables included in that regression
are scaled by firms’ closing stock prices, I present descriptive statistics using the same
convention. Looking at the dependent variable suggests that it is normally distributed. The mean
and the median of the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) average near to 0, the absolute values
of the quartile values are quite similar, and the standard deviation is relatively small (.0447).
Additionally, the frequency of negative CAR values (52.4%) is nearly identical to the number of
positive CAR values (47.6%).
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The transition adjustments recognized by the sample firms are overwhelmingly negative.
Of the 1,014 adjustments, 73% are negative (n=742) and 27% (n=271) are positive. Further
investigation reveals that these negative adjustments are primarily driven by FIN 48 and SFAS
No. 158, which collectively account for 52% of the total (449 of 742). Disaggregating the
transition adjustment variable reveals that for each of the financial statement locations examined
in this study, the mean location effects are negative (Table 6 -Panel B). Moreover, the magnitude
of the transition adjustments appears to vary significantly by location. In particular, the average
negative adjustments to net income and OCI are more negative than those adjustments that affect
retained earnings and other locations. In descending order of absolute value, the most negative
mean adjustment values (measured per-share and scaled by share price) are to: Other
Comprehensive Income (-.0153), net income (-.0146), and retained earnings (-.0017).
I perform T-tests to compare the mean location adjustments (Table 6 – Panel C). The
results of these tests indicate that there are significant differences in adjustment amounts
depending on their respective financial statement locations. Comparatively, the cumulative effect
type income adjustments are significantly more negative than the retained earnings adjustments
(P<.005), and both the cumulative effect adjustments are significantly more negative than the
adjustments to retained earnings (P<.001). Accordingly, in my regression analysis I introduce an
adjustment variable to control for magnitude, while separate explanatory variables are utilized to
differentiate between financial statement locations.
In order to identify whether the location in which transition adjustments are recognized
possess value relevance to investors, l regress the cumulative abnormal returns observed in the 3
days surrounding firms’ SEC filings on earnings surprise, adjustment magnitude, and financial
statement location variables. Table 7 presents the results of my regression analysis. Based on
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these results, it appears that the stock market responds to both earnings surprises (P<.001), as
well as to the magnitude of recognized transition adjustments (P<.05). However, the lack of
significant coefficients on any of the location variables suggests that the placement of transition
adjustments in the financial statements is not relevant to investors. Investors discern the
magnitude of adjustments and impound this information into firms’ stock prices without regard
to where these adjustments are presented in the financial statements.
Because my research design utilizes binary variables to represent the alternative financial
statement locations, one location is necessarily omitted from the regression. The retained
earnings location variable is excluded, and accordingly it serves as the reference group.
Therefore, the coefficients on the included location variables can be interpreted as the
incremental abnormal returns relative to the retained earnings location. In order to identify
whether the location variables jointly explain the abnormal returns, I perform a Wald test. The
results of this test are presented in Table 7 – Panel B. The insignificance of the F-stat (P value
= .5037) suggests that the location variables do not meaningfully contribute to the model.
8. Conclusion
In this paper I examined whether investors differentiate between commonly used
financial statement reporting locations in conjunction with the adoption of new accounting
standards. The answer to this question is important for at least two significant reasons. First,
there are implications for accounting standard setters, and second, the findings provide insight
into investor behavior.
The prescribed location for transition adjustments has been inconsistent across
accounting standards and throughout time. Because standard setters take into consideration
numerous factors when selecting each standard’s required transition adjustment location,
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significant variation in policies and practices has ensued. Much of this variation can be attributed
to standard setters’ desire to afford firms with implementation flexibility. For example, flexibility
both in timing and reporting location have historically characterized significant mandated
accounting standards. Balsam et al. (1995b) suggest that this flexibility is motivated by the
efforts of accounting standard setters to mitigate their own political costs vis-a-vis a reduction in
the costs that new standards impose on firms. The results of my study suggest that altering the
reporting location of transition adjustments is unlikely to impact firms’ share value. This means
that standard setters cannot effectively placate investors, who might be concerned that new
standards will impose adverse economic effects on firms, simply by affording managers with
flexibility in reporting location.
This paper also suggests that investors are capable of efficiently processing the
underlying information presented in firms’ financial statements, regardless of its location. In
particular, it undermines the presumption that firms can successfully conceal significant
information from investors by shifting it from one financial reporting location to another.
Furthermore, the results of this paper provide evidence that the stock market values transition
adjustments equally regardless of where they are reported in firms’ financial statements. This
conclusion, in turn, is consistent with pre-existing notions of investor abilities as dictated by the
efficient markets hypothesis. Thus, by exploring the capabilities of both standard setters and
investors this paper has practical implications for how we understand the entirety of the
accounting standards process and the people involved—at its beginning with the motivations
behind the setting of standards and the implications at the end on investor behavior and firm
value.
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Table 1 - Accounting Standards Included in Sample
Accounts Affected by Transition
Adjustments
Cumulative Adjustment to Retained
Earnings;
Cumulative Type Effect to Net Income

SFAS
115

Issuer
Description
FASB Accounting for Certain
Investments in Debt and
Equity Securities

Issued
5/1/1993

123r

FASB

Share Based Payment

12/1/2004 Cumulative Type Effect to Net Income;
Cumulative Adjustment to Retained
Earnings

133

FASB

Accounting for Derivative
Instruments and Hedging
Activities

6/1/1998

Cumulative Type Effect to Net Income;
Cumulative Effect type Change to Other
Comprehensive Income

142

FASB

Goodwill and Other
Intangible Assets

6/1/2001

Cumulative Type Effect to Net Income

143

FASB

Accounting for Asset
Retirement Obligations

6/1/2001

Cumulative Type Effect to Net Income

158

FASB

Employers' Accounting
for Defined Benefit
Pension and Other
Postretirement Plans

9/1/2006

Cumulative Effect type Change to Other
Comprehensive Income

159

FASB

The Fair Value Option for
Financial Assets and
Financial Liabilities

2/1/2007

Cumulative Adjustment to Retained
Earnings

166 & 167

FASB

Accounting for Transfers
of Financial Asset; and
Amendments to FASB
Interpretation No. 46®

6/1/2009

Cumulative Adjustment to Retained
Earnings

FIN 48

FASB

Accounting for
Uncertainty in Income
Taxes

6/1/2006

Cumulative Adjustment to Retained
Earnings

FSP 13-2

FASB

Accounting for a Change
or Projected Change in
the Timing of Cash Flows
Relating to Income Taxes
Generated by a Leveraged
lease Transaction

7/13/2006 Cumulative Adjustment to Retained
Earnings
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Accounts Affected by Transition
Adjustments

SFAS

Issuer

Description

Issued

SAB 101

SEC

Revenue Recognition in
Financial Statements

12/1/1999 Cumulative Type Effect to Net Income

SAB 108

SEC

Accounting for a Change
or Projected Change in
the Timing of Cash Flows
Relating to Income Taxes
Generated by a Leveraged
Lease Transaction

7/13/2006 Cumulative Adjustment to Retained
Earnings
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Table 2 - Firms in Sample
Initial sample size (S&P 500 Firms in Year 2000)

500

Firms with no observations, bankruptcy, merger, etc.

60

Firms Examined for Significant Transition Adjustments
Deleted from sample:
Unable to trace to Eventus
Unable to trace to I/B/E/S surprise file
Firms exclusively with multiple location adjustments in same period
Number of distinct firms in sample

440
7
19

26
13
401
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Table 3 -First SEC Disclosure Filings Quantifying Transition Adjustment
SEC
Disclosure
Filing
10-12G
10-K
10-Q
424B5
8-K
S-4/A

Actual
1
318
327
1
63
1
711

Estimate
0
161
137
0
5
0
303

Total
1
479
464
1
68
1
1,014

70%

30%

100%

Percent
0%
47%
46%
0%
7%
0%
100%
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Table 4 - Transition Adjustments by Year
Panel A: Transition Adjustment Locations by Firm Year
Retained
Year
Net Income
Earnings
1993
1
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2
2000
48
2001
32
2002
92
2003
31
2004
2005
2
2006
76
2007
178
2008
69
2009
3
2010
26
2011
1
206
355
20%

35%

OCI

Other
18
11
1

Total Firm
Years
19
11
1

2
109
72
92
31

61
40

1
225
60
10
1
17

2
4

415

38

41%

2
4%

5
305
238
79
4
45
1
1,014

100%

Note: A firm year is counted only once per year. If multiple locations are affected for a given firm
in the same year, those observations are dropped form the sample.
Panel B: Number of Standards Adopted by Firms in Sample
Standards No. of Firms
Percent
No. of Firm Years
1
105
26%
105
2
124
31%
248
3
88
22%
264
4
47
12%
188
5
19
5%
95
6
12
3%
72
7
6
1%
42
Total
401
100%
1,014

Percent
10%
24%
26%
19%
9%
7%
4%
100%
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Table 5 - Number of Transition Adjustments Recognized by Firms in Sample
Standard(s)
115
123r
133
142
143
158
159
166 and 167
FIN 48
FSP 13-2
SAB 101
SAB 108

Net
Income
1
53
71
56

25
206

Retained
Earnings
5

16
30
271
19
14
355

OCI
1
99

Other
30
6

288
9
18

2

415

38

Total Firm
Years
31
12
152
71
56
288
25
50
271
19
25
14
1,014
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Table 6 - Descriptive Statistics
n
Mean
Panel A: Aggregated Descriptive Statistics
CAR
1,014
0

Min

P25

Median

P75

Max

SD

(0.2177)

(0.0188)

(0.0014)

0.0181

0.2842

0.0414

Surprise

1,014

(0.0001)

(0.0672)

0

0

0

0.0269

0.0047

Adjustment

1,014

(0.0089)

(0.5195)

(0.0074)

(0.0012)

0.0001

0.7975

0.0494

Panel B: Location Specific Descriptive Statistics
Retained Earnings
355
(0.0017)

(0.3890)

(0.0025)

(0.0005)

0.0004

0.7975

0.0505

Net Income

206

(0.0146)

(0.4387)

(0.4387)

(0.0090)

(0.0001)

0.0398

0.0456

OCI

415

(0.0153)

(0.5195)

(0.0164)

(0.0047)

(0.0003)

0.4212

0.0491

Other

38

0.0261

0.0006

0.0046

0.0165

0.0277

0.1902

0.0381

Note: Explanatory variables are presented on a per share basis, and further scaled by share price.
Panel C: Test of mean adjustments across alternative reporting locations
Net Income
OCI
Retained Earnings
0.013 **
0.014
Net Income
0.001
OCI

***

Other
(0.028)
0.041)
(0.041)

**
***
***
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Table 7 – Regression of CAR on Financial Statement Location Variables
Regression of Cumulative Abnormal Returns on earnings surprise, adjustment amount, and categorical location variables.
Panel A - Regression
α

β1

β2

β3

Surprise

Adjustment

NI Dummy

β4
OCI
Dummy

β5
Other
Dummy

Adj R2

Coefficients
P-Values

0.0024
2.003
0.0572
0.0038
0.0040
0.0057
5.03%
0.2540
0.000 ***
(0.029) *
(0.284)
(0.177)
(0.410)
Note: Coefficients on interaction terms (B2* B3, B2*B4, and B2*B5) are not significant.
Panel B – Joint test for significance of the location dummy variables (B3-B5):
F (3, 1008) = .78
Prob > F = .5037
Where:
Represents the market model cumulative abnormal returns for S&P 500 firms that disclosed transition
CAR adjustments in 10-K filings.
Represents the difference between the arithmetic average of analysts’ mean earnings per share estimates at
Surprise the time earnings are released, and actual earnings per share.
Adjustment Per share amount of the transition adjustment recognized in firms' financial statements.
A binary variable equal to 1 when the transition adjustment is recognized as a cumulative effect type
NI_Dummy change on the Income Statement; 0 otherwise.
A binary variable equal to 1 when the transition adjustment is recognized as an adjustment to Other
OCI_Dummy Comprehensive Income; 0 otherwise.
A binary variable equal to 1 when the transition adjustment is recognized in a location other than Net
Other_Dummy Income, OCI, or Retained Earnings; 0 otherwise.
The omitted location category represents the reference group and reflects transition adjustments that are recognized as
adjustments to retained earnings. All explanatory variables are scaled by closing price per share at each firms’ year end.
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .1%, 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
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